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Abstract
Three Essays on the Cost of Debt Capital
by
Katarzyna Nelicka Platt
Adviser: Professor Armen Hovakimian
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine how product market competition
affects the cost of public bond debt and how credit rating adjustments influence the cost of
debt and leverage of industry rivals.
Chapter 1 explores how competitive threats affect the yield spread of corporate bonds.
I find that firms that face high levels of competition also face higher costs of debt. After
controlling for common bond-level, firm-level and macroeconomic variables, I find that bond-
holders of firms that are subject to increased competition demand significantly higher credit
spreads than holders of otherwise similar bonds. My analysis also reveals that information
about competition is incorporated in bond credit ratings. Combined, these findings provide
strong evidence that competitive threats are being reflected in corporate debt prices and
that competitive dynamics influence firms’ access to capital.
Chapter 2 analyzes the information transfer effect of bond rating adjustments among
firms competing in the same industry. Specifically, I investigate the impact of a bond credit
rating change with respect to one firm in an industry on the corporate bond yield spreads
of rival firms. I find that a credit rating downgrade of an investment-grade firm is followed
by a significant increase in the corporate bond yield spreads of competing firms in the same
industry. I also find that not all competitors are affected equally by bond credit rating
downgrades in their industry. Smaller, more opaque firms operating in competitive markets
v
are found to be more sensitive to rival’s credit adjustments.
Chapter 3 examines the intra-industry information transfer effect of bond rating adjust-
ments. I analyze how the effect of the announcement of a bond rating change is transferred
from the downgraded or upgraded company to its industry rivals. Specifically, I investigate
the effect of the rating change on the leverage ratios of rival firms. I find that rivals of
downgraded firms reduce their leverage in the year following the downgrade.
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Chapter 1
Competition and the Cost of
Corporate Bond Debt
1.1 Introduction
Competitive threats in the product market in which firms operate influence their financial
policies. Recent empirical work shows that higher levels of competition lead to higher level
of cash holdings, lower dividend payments, and greater hedging (e.g., Chi and Su (2013);
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014); Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007)). Further-
more, firms facing more competition face increased cost of bank loan financing (Valta, 2012).
This paper extends the literature by exploring how product market competition affect the
cost of public debt.
Bondholders focus on future cash flows to ensure a firm’s ability to pay periodic interest
and bond principal. Because higher levels of product market threats may have negative im-
pact on future cash flows, bondholders are likely to be concerned about the firm’s competitive
position. Therefore, bondholders may benefit from less competitive product markets, which
1
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enjoy higher profit margins and lower default risk. Additionally, liquidation value is impor-
tant to the bondholders, because in the event of default on promised payments creditors
have the right to take over the assets. Since buyers of these assets who operate inside the
firm’s industry are willing to pay higher prices for an asset than buyers who operate outside
the industry, firms operating in more competitive environments are expected to have lower
liquidation values (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This is because firms subject to higher levels
of competition may have lower profit margins and less financial slack and may not be able to
purchase the assets in question. Therefore, product market competition can negatively affect
the cost of public bond debt through both the increased probability of default and decreased
firm liquidation value. On the other hand, a larger number of competitors in an industry
raises the likelihood that a defaulted firm’s assets can be sold at high prices, increasing that
firm’s liquidation value of assets and hence reducing the cost of debt capital.
Additionally, competition may act as a disciplinary mechanism and reduce agency prob-
lem (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997; Giroud and Mueller, 2011). The literature documents the
existence of a substantial shareholder-bondholder conflict, where shareholders expropriate
wealth from bondholders by over-investing in risky projects and capturing most of the
gains while at the same time shifting the cost onto the creditors (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005). Consequently, product market competition re-
duces asymmetric information and monitoring costs by generating greater opportunities for
outsiders to benchmark the performance of a firm to the performance of its competitors and
thus reduces managerial slack and the likelihood of over-investment. Therefore, if compe-
tition reduces agency problems and acts as a substitute for corporate governance, it may
actually reduce the cost of debt. Conversely, in less competitive industries, bondholders may
be exposed to greater default risk.
Overall, the previous literature suggests that product market competition can have both
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positive and negative impact on the cost of debt financing. Therefore, the goal of this paper
is to extend the literature and identify whether product market competition is an important
determinant of debt pricing and reveal the net direction of that effect.
Traditional competitive economic theory predicts that the level of product market com-
petition increases with the number of competitors. For this reason, market concentration,
proxied by either the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (henceforth HHI) or the four-firm con-
centration ratio, is frequently used to measure competition. Both measures focus on the
distribution of production across firms within an industry. However, some researchers worry
that market concentration may not accurately reflect the changes in the competitive dynam-
ics of product markets that occur within industries that do not experience the addition or
loss of a competitor. For example, competition becomes more intense if one firm’s prod-
ucts are more ready substitutes for another firm’s product. An additional problem with the
traditional measures of competition is that they do not capture potential competition and
they require a definition of the relevant product market. However, this could be difficult for
some industries, such as business services, which are not well defined (Phillips, 2013). What
is more, using HHI as a proxy for market competition inevitably leads to an endogeneity
problem if financial policy and product market strategy are jointly determined. Therefore, it
may be problematic to draw clear inferences from empirical research based on HHI. The level
of HHI in a specific industry could very likely represent an equilibrium outcome of competi-
tion for that industry. Because of this, it may be unclear whether higher levels of industry
HHI measures represent higher or lower levels of competition. Valta and Fresard (2013),
using reductions in import tariff rates as a source of variation in competitive pressure, find
that firms’ reaction to increased competition is indeed heterogeneous and depends on com-
petitive position as well as on the structure of the product markets. Also, Kjenstad and Su
(2013) show that under certain market structures a larger number of competitors may reduce
the chances of predation, if the predator has to share the profit from predation with more
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competitors or free-riders. Hence, increasing the number of competitors may decrease the
intensity of competition. Therefore, HHI may not accurately capture all different dimensions
of competition, and HHI as an industry-level measure may not reflect some of the dynamic
interactions between firms within the industry.
For that reason, in addition to traditional measures of competition such as HHI and four-
firm concentration ratio, I am using a novel measure of competition, fluidity, developed by
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). There are two important reasons for this measure
choice. Firstly, fluidity captures the similarity between a firm’s products and the product
evolution of its rivals. It allows for the separation of the effect of competitive threats from
the effect of market concentration. Secondly, because it measures moves made by rival firms
competing in a product space, the potential endogeneity problem is mitigated. Although
fluidity is a novel measure, it has been used in several recent studies as a proxy for prod-
uct market competition. Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) show that product market
fluidity decreases firm propensity to make payouts via dividends or repurchases. It also in-
creases cash held by firms, especially for firms with less access to financial markets. When
product markets are changing rapidly, the future is less certain and this, in turn, has an
effect on firm’s payout policy, which is based on the expectations about the future market
for the firms’ products. Kjenstad and Su (2012) find that for small firms, fluidity is signifi-
cantly related to the use of performance sensitive debt. Specifically, they find that product
market threats are negatively related to the probability of bank loan contracts having the
performance-sensitive feature. Morellec, Valta, and Zhdanov (2014) look at the firm’s deci-
sion to issue bank debt versus public debt. In their study, they find that firms operating
in more competitive product market and facing lower credit supply are more likely to issue
public debt.
Another strand of literature investigates the relationship between product market com-
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petition and debt financing costs. Valta (2012) links product market competition to spreads
on bank loans. Using several market concentration-based proxies for product market compe-
tition, the author empirically shows that firms operating in competitive environments have
significantly higher costs of debt financing. Moreover, his paper shows that the effect of
competition on debt pricing depends also on rival financial strength, meaning that the firms
who are in industry leading positions not only benefit from cheaper financing but could also
increase the cost of financing for their rivals. Paligorova and Yang (2014) examine the im-
pact of product market competition and corporate governance on the cost of debt financing
and the use of bond covenants. The article uses market concentration as a proxy for prod-
uct market competition and concludes that firms with higher anti-takeover provisions pay a
lower cost of debt only in competitive industries, as product market competition increases
the probability of takeovers.
In this paper, using the universe of bond transactions, I find that higher product market
competition is associated with higher costs of debt financing. After controlling for industry
and firm specific attributes, my analysis indicates that debt costs are significantly higher for
firms with high product similarity to their competitors. Specifically, a one stardard deviation
increase in product market competition increases bond yield spreads by about 10%, which is
30 basis points for an average bond in my sample. I also find a negative relationship between
product market competition and bond credit rating. Specifically, I find that one standard
deviation increase in product market competition decreases firm’s bond credit rating by one
half of a credit rating notch. The results are robust to various specifications and control
variables and are both economically and statistically significant. Overall, my results suggest
that bondholders take product markets into consideration in the pricing of the firm’s debt.
This paper is closest to that of Valta (2012) who also studies the effect of product market
competition on the cost of debt. However, this paper analyzes public bond markets, whereas
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Valta (2012) concentrates on the market for bank loans. Thus, this paper contributes to the
literature by identifying that changes in product market dynamics affect corporate bond val-
uation. I add to to the literature that studies the interactions between product markets and
financial markets. By providing compelling evidence that bond yields incorporate a substan-
tial product market dimension, this analysis broadens the understanding of the implications
of the industry structure for the cost of debt financing. Also, my study complements re-
cent papers that document how corporate behavior is influenced by the decisions of firms’
peers (MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Leary and Roberts, 2014). By establishing a link between
product market threats and corporate bond pricing, the findings of this paper suggest that
there are spillover effects between product market rivals. Those effects have implications for
the firm’s financial decisions. Studies by Fresard (2010) and Chi and Su (2013) also show
that firms do not operate in isolation, but incorporate rivals’ financial status and competitive
position in their decision process. Their research sheds light on the role of cash holdings and
product market threats. Firms that hold large cash reserves enjoy future market share gains
at the expense of their rivals. Last, but not least, I also extend the recent research in corpo-
rate bond pricing explaining what factors affect bond credit spreads (Collin-Dufresne et al.,
2001; Elton et al., 2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Chen et al., 2007; Dick-Nielsen et al.,
2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops the hypotheses.
Section 1.3 introduces the data, presents the summary statistics, and describes the empirical
strategy. Section 1.4 presents the main results and sensitivity tests. Section 1.5 presents the
paper’s conclusions.
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1.2 Hypothesis Development
Credit spread has two main determinants: the risk of default itself; and the recovery rate,
where, in the event of default, the bondholder receives only a portion of the promised pay-
ments (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001). Product market competition levels
influence both of these determinants. The higher the competitive threats from rival firms,
the less certain are the future cash flows of the firm. This, in turn, increases firm’s default
risk. Hou and Robinson (2006) argue that the structure of product markets helps to deter-
mine a firm’s risk by affecting the equilibrium operating decisions it makes. They find that
stocks of companies operating in more competitive industries earn higher average returns
and attribute this premium to higher default risk of these firms. When competition is more
intense, firms that fail to quickly adapt to changes in the environment are drawn out of
business. Therefore it is likely that creditors require higher rates of return on their capital
from firms that face more product market competition.
Furthermore, the asset liquidation value may also be affected by competition. Whenever
firms assets are liquidated, the highest value potential buyers are likely to be other firms in
the industry, provided that they have financial slack. Otherwise the assets may be sold to
industry outsiders for a lower price (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Since competitive product
market may influence both the financial strength and number of firms in the industry, higher
levels of product market competition may also affect the cost of debt by reducing the firm’s
liquidation value (Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014).
Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014), show that firms with more illiquid real assets have a
higher cost of capital. Valta (2012) posits that competitive threats may impact dimensions
that may be distinct from default risk, such as firm’s collateral value.In adverse economic
circumstances, firms may be under pressure to restructure their operations in order to avoid
default, especially if they own unproductive assets which generate large fixed costs. There-
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fore, firms that own more illiquid assets will be subject to increased cost of debt financing.
Firms that operate in markets that are subject to more product market competition, may
be especially susceptible to such effect, because in those markets firms that fail to quickly
adapt to changes in the environment will be drawn out of business quicker.
Generally firms that exhibit high tangibility are believed to be less risky as a result of
high collateral value; however, it is possible that firms that face considerable amounts of
product market threats and, as a result, have lower profit margins than firms from less
competitive industries have liquidation values of their tangible assets lower than firms from
less dynamic markets. This is because there may be fewer potential buyers that would have
enough financial slack to purchase the bankrupt or restructuring firm’s assets. Therefore, it
is possible that competition affects bond credit spreads through an impact on firm’s collateral
value.
In his article, Valta (2012) finds that competition is an important determinant of banks’
willingness to provide financing and the price of the offer. He examines how competition
relates to the cost of bank debt and finds that the bank loans of firms that operate in
competitive product markets exhibit higher spreads. This result should also hold true for
bondholders. Consequently, I expect the bond market participants to take product market
threats into consideration when pricing the firm’s debt. Accordingly, my first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The level of product market competition is positively related to bond yield
spreads.
Also, higher cost of debt will lead rating agencies to assign lower bond ratings to firms
where product market threats are more substantial. In conducting its surveillance, a rating
agency will consider many factors, including, but not limited to: changes in the business
climate, credit markets, new technology or competition that may hurt an issuer’s earnings or
projected revenues; issuer performance; and regulatory changes (Standard & Poor’s, 2011).
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Credit agencies pay close attention to product differentiation, competitive advantage and its
sustainability. Thus, to examine whether product market threats have an impact on bond
ratings I formulate the next hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The level of product market competition is negatively related to bond ratings.
1.3 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Sample
The data for this study come from several sources. The main sample of firms is obtained from
Annual Compustat files. Following the standard approach, I exclude firms in the financial
sector (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4999). I also exclude firms with values of
total assets or sales are less than one million dollars and replace extreme observations of all
ratio variables with missing values (those in one percent in both tails of the distribution).
Leverage ratios are trimmed at the value one.
There is no readily available dataset of bond pricing. In order to construct bond prices, I
use bond transaction data from the Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)
database which reports individual bond transactions at a daily (or finer) frequency. This
database, operated by FINRA, and now covers essentially all publicly traded bonds is a
result of a recent regulatory initiative to increase the price transparency in secondary cor-
porate bond markets. The TRACE database initiated in 2002, became fully operational
in 2005 (Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman, 2006; Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar,
2007).12
1The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA), formerly National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD), is a private corporation that acts as a non-governmental, self-regulatory organization
that regulates member brokerage firms and exchange markets. http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/
2See FINRA news release http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P013274.
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Since the TRACE database provides me with a short time series of data, I extend the
sample with data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’s (NAIC) bond
transaction file, which cover all insurance companies’ trading records of publicly traded
bonds in the post-1994 period. NAIC data is obtained from Mergent Fixed Income Securi-
ties Database (FISD) and contains prices for all trades in public corporate bonds made by
insurance companies since 1994. I follow the cleaning procedure of bond data outlined in
Dick-Nielsen (2009) and Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) and eliminate can-
celed, corrected, and commission trades. I also eliminate observations that are obvious data
entry errors, e.g. with negative prices, with maturity dates prior to issuance or trade dates,
etc.
Mergent’s FISD portion of the database contains a comprehensive set of bond character-
istics. I use FISD to obtain bond-level information such as issue date, issuance size, coupon
rate, and credit rating, as well as to identify the special features of bonds. I exclude all con-
vertible bonds, pay-in-kind bonds, asset-backed securities, Yankee bonds, Canadian bonds,
bonds denominated in non-U.S. currencies, floating-rate bonds, unit deals, puttable bonds,
exchangeable bonds, perpetual bonds and agency bonds from my sample.
In order to calculate bond prices using the combined TRACE and NAIC dataset, I follow
the methodology proposed by Bessembinder et al. (2009) and eliminate all trades that are
below $ 100,000 and construct a daily price by weighing each trade by its size. For my
sample, I retain the last daily price available for a given bond that is closest to the end
of the fiscal year, provided that the difference between the last trade date and the end of
the fiscal year is less than 90 days. Next, I use these prices to calculate yield to maturity.
In tests of new bond issues, I employ the promised yield to maturity at issue reported by
Mergent FISD.
Information on stock prices, trading volume, and market capitalizations are obtained from
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the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). S&P credit ratings are obtained from
Mergent FISD database.
I obtain data related to firms product market environment, including data on HHI, in-
dustry classification and product market fluidity, from the Hoberg- Phillips data library.3
Data on foreign trade are acquired from Peter Schott’s Web site. Macroeconomic data
are retrieved from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Treasury bond data from
Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis. Data on firm level default probability is obtained from
Kamakura’s Risk Manager.
1.3.2 Variables
Measuring Bond Yield Spreads and Bond Credit Ratings
The dependent variables in my analysis are bond yield spreads and bond ratings. My
first dependent variable, natural logarithm of bond yield spread, measures the cost of debt
(Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann, 2001; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005). The yield
spread is defined as the difference between the yield-to-maturity on a corporate bond and
the yield-to-maturity on its maturity-equivalent risk-free bond. To calculate yield spreads
for individual corporate bonds, I use the constant maturity Benchmark Treasury rates as
risk-free rates. Since the rates are available for maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 30 years,
If there is no maturity-equivalent Treasury security available to match the maturity of the
corporate bond, I perform a linear interpolation between the two closest maturity matches
to estimate the entire yield curve.
My second dependent variable is bond credit rating, which measures the perceived risk
of the bond. I measure the bonds’ credit rating by the S&P credit ratings that assess the
3The data is available at http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/.
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creditworthiness of the obligor with respect to its debt obligations. There are 21 ratings
ranging from highest (AAA) to lowest (C) in the S&P rating sample. I convert the letter
ratings into numerical equivalents using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the lowest rated
firms to 17 for the highest rated firms (AAA). Because I have very few observations with a C
rating, I follow Alp (2013) and I pool C, CC, CCC+ and CCC- together to form the lowest
ordinal category. I also exclude observations with credit ratings D that indicate default from
the analysis.
Measuring Product Market Competition
My first proxy for product market competition, fluidity, captures how company’s i ’s rivals are
changing the product words that overlap with company i ’s vocabulary. Technically, fluidity
is the dot product between the words used in a firms business description and the change
in the words used by its rivals. The variable is constructed by Hoberg et al. (2014) using
text-based analysis of 10K product descriptions. Fluidity reflects product market threats
and instabilities arising from actions of firm i ’s competitors. Because fluidity is calculated
each year and captures the change in rivals word usage relative to the firms word usage, it
is a dynamic measure of product similarity.
A second proxy for product market competition is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI).





where sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are computed
from Compustat using firms’ sales (Giroud and Mueller, 2011). When computing the HHI I
use all available Compustat firms. I exclude firms for which sales are missing or negative. HHI
CHAPTER 1. COMPETITION AND THE COST OF CORPORATE BOND DEBT 13
is widely used measure in the empirical industrial organization literature as a proxy for the
intensity of product market competition. It is also routinely used by government agencies. A
higher HHI implies weaker competition. I classify industries using four-digit SIC industries.4
In robustness checks I also use three-digit SIC industries. To identify competitive industries
I follow Valta (2012) and define a dummy variable HHI Dummy which equals one if the HHI
is in the lowest quartile of the yearly sample distribution and equals zero otherwise. This
procedure mitigates measurement problems which sometimes arise when measuring HHI and
allows for an intuitive economic interpretation of the results.
I also employ the four-firm concentration ratio (C4-Index ) as my third proxy for compe-
tition. C4-Index measures the market share of the four largest firms in an industry, where
market shares, similarly to HHI, are computed based on firms’ sales.
Control Variables
I selected a number of explanatory variables based on prior research on the determinants of
corporate bond spreads and credit ratings. The studies typically explain bond spreads in
terms of issue characteristics, issuer characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Therefore,
in my study, I control for several macroeconomic, bond-specific, and firm-specific proxies for
common default and recovery risk factors. This is to verify that known determinants of
credit spreads do not drive my results. Table 1.13 in the Appendix provides the list of all
variables with brief descriptions.
All of my regressions control for the characteristics of the bond issued. Since the increase
in leverage makes the bond riskier, then the issue size relative to firm’s assets should be
related to higher yield spread (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel, 1999). Longer maturity
4Kahle and Walkling (1996) show that tests in which firms are matched to their industry using 4-digit
Compustat SIC codes are likely to have considerable power.
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debt is subject to greater interest rate risk exposure and can have a higher default risk.
What is more, longer maturities may make it easier for shareholders to gain at the expense
of the bondholders by means of selecting riskier projects. Therefore, the relationship between
a bond’s maturity and yield spreads is expected to be negative (Ortiz-Molina, 2006).
Following Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2004) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) I
include coupon rate in my analysis. Throughout most of the period used in our study the
tax rates on capital gains and interest income were the same, but since capital gains are
paid at the time of sale, bonds with lower coupons may be more valuable due to the fact
that some taxes are postponed until the time of sale and because the holder of the bond has
control over when these taxes are paid.
In certain specifications, I also include a dummy variable controlling for the callable
feature of the bond. From the bondholder’s perspective, callable bonds bear prepayment
risk. Therefore I expect callable bonds to have higher yield spreads.
Several recent studies such as Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis
(2005) and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) posit that liquidity is priced in the yield spread.
For the same promised cash flows, less liquid bonds trade less frequently, realize lower prices
and exhibit higher spreads. Therefore, I control for bond liquidity by including a trading
activity measure. Turnover is the natural logarithm of yearly turnover in percent of the total
amount outstanding.
To control for firm-specific variation, I use accounting variables similar to measures used in
Campbell and Taksler (2003); Klock et al. (2005), and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012). High levels
of profitability, measured as operating income to sales indicate that the firm is financially
healthy and are expected to be associated with a low yield spread. On the other hand, high
levels of leverage are expected to to be associated with a higher yield spread, as higher debt
usage is associated with an increase on the probability of default and therefore a higher cost of
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debt financing. Firm size is measured as the natural log of total assets and is expected to be
negatively related to yield spreads, as larger firms are generally considered safer investments
because of larger asset bases, higher likelihood of diversified assets, greater proportion of
tangible assets and overall better chances of survival in the long run (Ortiz-Molina, 2006).
Because investment in fixed capital is easily observable and can provide for good collateral,
firms with high levels of tangible assets are generally considered less risky, Therefore, I expect
asset tangibility to be negatively correlated with yield spreads.
I also include firm-level default probability obtained from Kamakura’s Risk Manager.
It is based on Merton Structural Model that uses option pricing methods to relate the
probability of firm default to its financial structure and information about the firms market
price of equity. The variables used in the model include a measure of the firms outstanding
debt, its market valuation, and information about firm and market equity price behavior.5
Since yield spreads vary through time, I include a set of year dummy variables to capture
the potential effects of changes in the term structure and the economic environment that may
affect the bond yield spreads in a given year. Also, I include 49 industry dummies based on
Fama and French (1997) to ensure that it is the variation in product fluidity within industries
that identifies the coefficients I estimate in my regressions.
1.3.3 Specifications
First, I test the cross-sectional relation between various proxies for product market competi-
tion and the cost of debt financing while controlling for firm- and security- specific measures.
To test the relation between product market competition and bond yields and ratings, I use
the following general specification:
5http://www.kamakuraco.com
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Spreadj,i,t = δ(Competitioni,t−1) + β
′Xi,t−1 + γ
′Yj,t−1 + αt + λj + ǫj,i,t (1.2)
Subscripts j, i, and t, represent the bond, firm, and year, respectively. The dependent variable
Spreadj,i,t is the logarithm of the bond yield spread.
6 My primary interest is in the marginal
effect of product market competition on bond credit spreads δ. The vector Xi,t−1 includes
control variables at firm level and the vector Yj,t−1 includes control variables at the bond
level. I also include year dummies αt and industry fixed effects λj in some specifications.
7 I
cluster all standard errors at the firm level.
Next, to test whether product market competition predicts bond ratings I estimate both
the ordinary least squares model as well as the ordered probit model, given that the depen-
dent variable is ordinal (Ederington, 1985).
Ratingj,i,t = δ(Competitioni,t−1) + β
′Xi,t−1 + γ
′Yj,t−1 + αt + λj + ǫj,i,t (1.3)
Subscripts j, i, and t, represent the bond, firm, and year, respectively. The dependent
variable Ratingj,i,t is the ordinal variable ranging from 1 for the lowest rated firms to 17 for
the highest rated firms. My primary interest is in the marginal effect of product market
competition on bond credit rating δ. The vector Xi,t−1 includes control variables at firm
level and the vector Yj,t−1 includes control variables at the bond level. I also include year
dummies αt and industry fixed effects λj in some specifications. I cluster all standard errors
at the firm level.
6I follow Valta (2012) and use the natural logarithm of bond credit spreads to address the problem of
skewness in the data. If I use levels of bond credit spreads, the results remain virtually unchanged.
7My research question is aimed at understanding cross-sectional variation in the product market compe-
tition proxies, and including firm-fixed effects seems to defeat this purpose. In the fixed effects setting, all
variables are forced to have the same mean. Therefore, the data variation that would identify δ would be
within-firm variation and not the cross-sectional variation I am interested in (Roberts and Whited, 2012).
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1.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents bond, firm and product market competition characteristics. There are
6118 bonds in my full sample, although the total number of bonds varies from year to year.
The total number of firms issuing the bonds in my sample is 1231 firms, which amounts to
around 3 bonds per firm.
Panel A of Table 1 reports bond characteristics. In the sample, the average bond credit
spread is 306 basis points over a corresponding maturity Treasury instrument, whereas a
median bond credit spread is almost 206 basis points. The average bond maturity is about
10 years and the bonds mean offering size is $390 million. Over 70 percent of the bond
sample is callable bonds. Around 33% of the bonds in my sample are non-investment grade.
Panel B presents firm level statistics. The average bond issuer in my study is the firm
with approximately $11 billion in total assets. The average firm exhibits high leverage, with
the mean leverage ratio of 35.6%. The mean profitability level of my sample firms is 15%.
The average market-to-book is 1.6 and tangibility ratio is almost 35%.
Table 1.2 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients between the competition proxies and
measures of cost of debt. In general, bond credit spread is negatively correlated to HHI and
C4-Index, which suggests that firms that exhibit lower concentration ratios have higher cost
of debt capital. The Fluidity variable is positively correlated to bond credit spread, which
further confirms that firms that are exposed to higher levels of product market threats have
higher cost of public debt capital. However, the multivariate framework is necessary since
other factors such as firm size are known to have an effect on debt yields.
In order to obtain further insight on the relation between competition and bond credit
spreads, I analyze the distribution of bond credit spreads across groups based on the flu-
idity level, concentration ratio and the C4-Index. First, Panel A of Table 1.3 reports the
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average and median bond credit spreads for quartile portfolios of bonds formed using the
Fluidity measure. In each year, I group observations into four groups based on Fluidity. Ob-
servations with low levels of Fluidity are assigned into quartile 1 (Q1) and observations with
high levels of Fluidity are assigned into quartile 4 (Q4). The last row reports the differences
between the means and the medians of the first and fourth quartile along with their level of
significance.
Panel A of Table Table 1.3 shows that there are significant differences between bond
credit spreads of firms that exhibit high levels of product market fluidity versus the firms
that exhibit low levels of product market fluidity. The average bond credit spread for firms
that exhibit high levels of fluidity is 363 basis points. The spread decreases monotonically
from higher to lower levels of fluidity. For firms with low level of fluidity the average spread
is 260 basis points. The difference of 102 basis points is economically and statistically
significant. Also, firms with low fluidity have a median spread lower by almost 81 basis
points and that difference is also statistically significant. This suggests that bondholders of
firms that operate in more dynamic, competitive environment demand higher yields than
bondholders of firms operating in less competitive markets.
Next, I conduct a quartile analysis based on product market concentration measure,
HHI. Panel B presents average and median corporate bond spreads for quartile portfolios
formed using the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI ) at the three-digit industry level from
Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Higher values of HHI are associated with lower level of compe-
tition. In order to form quartile portfolios, I sort bonds each year based on HHI and assign
bonds into quartiles. Next, I compute average and median loan spreads for each quartile.
I report the difference in means and medians between competitive (Q4) and concentrated
(Q1) industries. The spread decreases monotonically from more to less concentrated indus-
tries with a significant difference of 112 basis points. Also, firms with low concentration
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have a median spread higher by over 85 basis points and that difference is also statistically
significant.
In Panel C of Table 1.3 I repeat the same procedure for the C4-Index. Higher values of
C4 Index are associated with lower level of competition. The spread decreases from more to
less concentrated industries with a significant difference of 100 basis points. Also, firms with
low concentration have a median spread higher by over 70 basis points and that difference
is also statistically significant.
1.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I empirically test the hypotheses formed earlier. In my tests, all t-values are
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering.
1.4.1 Regression Analysis
Product Market Competition and the Cost of Debt Capital
Using the yield spread to the U.S. Treasury benchmark for every bond at the end of each
year as a dependent variable, I first consider how product market competition affects the
cost of public debt. I apply a multivariate regression model exploiting the cross-sectional
variation in product market competition to examine whether the level of competitive threats
affects the cost of debt finance. Table 1.4 presents the coefficient estimates for my primary
specification. In Panel A column 1, the coefficient of Fluidity is 0.0303 and it is statistically
significant at the 1% confidence level. This implies that firms that exhibit higher fluidity
of their products have higher spreads on their corporate bonds as their counterparts with
less fluid products. This means that one standard deviation change in the level of product
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market threats when proxied by Fluidity leads to a change in corporate bond credit spread
by approximately 10%. This effect is economically significant. For the sample average bond
credit spread of 306.4 basis points, this coefficient translates to a difference of 30 basis points.
The coefficients on the control variables have the expected signs. Negative coefficient
on size suggests that larger firms have easier access to financing. The coefficient on proxy
for growth opportunities, market-to-book, is also negative. Other control variables such as
interest coverage, tangibility, profitability, bond size and bond maturity are consistent with
previous literature (Valta, 2012). In column 2 I include year and industry fixed effects to
control for unobserved time effects and industry fixed effects to control for differences between
industries that are unrelated to product market competition that could influence bond credit
spreads. The coefficient on Fluidity remains statistically and economically significant.
In column 3 I estimate the equation using Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach. Still, the
coefficient on Fluidity is positive and significant. In Panel B of table 1.4 I repeat the analysis
using HHI Dummy as my primary variable of interest. I find that the coefficient on HHI
Dummy is 0.101 in the baseline specification and statistically significant in all three models.
This coefficient allows for a straightforward economic interpretation and confirms the result
from columns 1 thrugh 3. On average, bond credit spreads for firms in competitive indus-
tries (HHI in the lowest quartile) have a 10% higher spread than loans in less competitive
industries. In Panel C I repeat the analysis from Panel A using C4-Index and confirm the
earlier results.
In Table 1.5 I run additional specifications in which I introduce additional control vari-
ables. In column 1 I control for default risk using the default probability from the Merton
model and the Z-score as additional measure of default probability.
The effect of product market competition on bond yield spread remains positive after
these controls are added, which suggests that these proxies of firm’s default risk do not fully
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capture the bond market’s assessment of competitive threats. In column 2 I include S&P
bond credit rating as a control variable. I also follow Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005)
and include a control variable High Yield, which is a dummy variable indicating a below
investment-grade credit rating. This is to control for a fact that yield spread exhibits a
distinct jump when going from investment to non-investment rating. Additionally, I include
the callable dummy. The coefficient on all three proxies for product market threats remain
statistically and economically significant. In column 3 I include other control variables that
capture other unobservable effects, such as Credit spread (a difference between BAA and
AAA corporate bonds), Term spread (difference between yields on 10-year Treasury bonds
and 2-year Treasury bonds) The inclusion of these additional variables does not change the
significance or economic magnitude of the coefficients of interest.
New Issues
Next, I examine new issues of corporate bonds. My dependent variable is bond credit
spreads at issue. The new issues data provides direct transaction prices and does not rely
on potentially less accurate matrix prices taken from secondary data. Table 1.6 presents the
results. The coefficient on all three proxies of competition are significant for all specifications.
They analysis confirms my initial result that product market competition is significantly
related to the cost of debt. Furthermore, I find and that higher levels of competition are
associated with higher spreads on new corporate bond issues.
Credit Ratings and Competition
One of the most important factors influencing bond yield spread is the credit rating. I ex-
amine whether credit rating agencies incorporate product market threats in bond ratings.
In this section, I estimate both the ordered probit model and ordinary least squares model
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to relate bond ratings to my measure of product market threats and bond and firm char-
acteristics. The main model is given in equation (??). The dependent variable is the S&P
Credit Rating for a given corporate bond converted into numerical identifiers 1 through 17
(AAA receives a score of 17). I also estimate the same model using Moody’s Credit Rating
as my dependent variable and obtain similar results (not reported for brevity).
Control variables include firm level controls such as leverage, size, profitability, tangibility,
market-to-book ratio, total assets and default probability, as well as bond level controls such
as bond size, coupon and maturity. Table 1.7 presents the maximum likelihood estimates
of the credit rating using an ordered probit specification. Except for tangibility in certain
specifications, most of firm characteristics are significant and consistent with prior literature
and expectations. Larger, more profitable and less levered firms obtain better credit ratings.
The coefficient estimate on market-to-book ratio is positive, which indicates that firms which
exhibit higher growth opportunities are less risky. As expected, default probability is nega-
tively related to credit ratings. Bond characteristics are significant for some specifications.
My explanatory variables of interest are significant for all specifications. This result implies
that greater product market competition decreases credit ratings.
This analysis reveals that information about product markets incorporated in the level
of product market threats is valuable for determining ratings on corporate bonds. This
indicates that product market competition captures certain aspects of product market risk
that are not reflected in other variables.
In Table 1.8 I present the specification defined by equation (1.2) and included rating fixed
effects. I find that the coefficients on product market competition are still statistically and
economically significant,which implies that product market competition affects the cost of
public bond debt not only through default probability channel, but also potentially through
liquidation value of assets channel.
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Public debt Market Access and Competition
In Table 1.9 I examine whether the firms that have access to public bond debt markets are
operating in the less competitive environments. I use the indicator whether the firm has a
debt rating as a measure of access to public bond markets (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006).
Consistent with the literature, around 20% of the companies in the Compustat sample have
access to public debt markets in a given year. I also have to consider the endogeneity of
becoming rated. Notably, having a rating is related to a firm’s size and leverage. In addition
to controlling for these factors in my analysis I also control for profitability, tangibility and
the level of market-to-book. If we compare firms that are able to borrow from the bond
market with those that cannot, we will find that product market competition decreases the
likelihood of having access to public bond markets.
Decision to Issue Debt vs. Equity and Competition
Table 1.10 describes the results from estimating the probit model of the probability of issuing
debt versus equity as a function of the independent variables. The independent variable is
a dummy variable taking a value of one for firms that have a net debt issue of at least 5%
of their book assets and zero for firms that have an equity issue of at least 5% of their book
assets (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001). The results suggest that firms with higher
level of product market competition are more likely to issue equity than debt. This confirms
the result from Table 1.9 that product market competition makes it less likely for the firm
to access debt markets and is consistent with the idea that it is more difficult for the firm
facing increased product market threats to finance itself with debt. This further confirms
that the level of product market competition influences firm’s access to capital.
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1.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Reductions of Import Tariff Rates
In order to further confirm the results of my analysis, I examine the response of the corporate
bond spreads to unexpected variations of industry import tariff rates. I follow Valta (2012)
and Fresard (2010) and use large reductions of tariff import rates as events that can trigger a
sudden increase in competitive pressure from foreign rivals. In order to conduct this analysis,
I use U.S. import data compiled by Schott (2010). For each industry-year I calculate the ad-
valorem tariff rate as the duties collected by U.S. custom divided by the Free-on-Board value
of imports. Next, I compare the tariff reduction in a given industry to the same industry’s
average change over the whole sample period. I first compute the average and median tariff
rate changes and the largest tariff rate change for each industry (the averages and medians
are negative). Next, I identify all industries in which the largest tariff rate reduction is larger
than three times the average (median) tariff rate reduction for that industry. I also exclude
tariff rate reductions that are preceded or followed by equivalently large increases in tariff
rates.
In order to test for the effect of large changes in import tariff rates on corporate bond
yield spreads, I follow Valta (2012) and estimate the model:
yi,j,t = δ(Post-Reductionj,t) + β
′Xi,t−1 + αt + ǫi,j,t (1.4)
In the model, the subscripts i, j and t represent the borrower, industry and the year,
respectively. The dependent variable yi,j,t is the natural logarithm of the loan spread. The
vector Xi,t−1 includes the control variables. The variable Post-Reductionj,t is a dummy
variable that equals one if industry j has experienced a tariff rate reduction by year t that is
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larger than three times the median tariff rate reduction in industry j and zero otherwise. I
also include year fixed effects αt in the estimations. The coefficient δ on the Post-Reductionj,t
variable is the estimate of the competitive shock’s effect on bond credit spreads.
Table 1.11 presents the univariate tests that explore whether bond credit spreads are
affected by tariff rate reductions. Specifically, the table presents average bond credit spreads
before and after a competitive shock for all firms as well as for the subsamples of large and
small firms. Large firms are defined as having their total asset size above the sample median
and small firms are defined as having their total asset size below the sample median. Panel
A shows that loan spreads increase by 44 basis points after tariff rate reduction for the full
sample of firms. This increase is statistically and economically significant. Further analysis
of panels B and C reveals that the effect is more prominent for large firms: almost 56 basis
points increase in bond credit spreads, whereas only 13 basis points increase for small firms.
Table 1.12 presents the estimation results from equation 1.4. I define the variable of
interest, Post-Reductionj,t three different ways: In column 1 Post-Reductionj,t is equal to
one if tariff rate reduction is at least three times larger than the median tariff rate reduction
in that industry. In column 2, Post-Reductionj,t equals one if the tariff rate reduction is
two times larger than the median tariff rate reduction in that industry. In column 1 Post-
Reductionj,t is equal to one if tariff rate reduction is at least three times larger than the mean
tariff rate reduction in that industry. Post-Reductionj,t is positive and significant in all three
specifications. The results suggest that the bondholders require higher bond spreads in the
aftermath of a competitive shock. To sum up, the results in Table 1.12 further confirm the
main findings of this paper that a higher intensity of competition significantly increases bond
credit spreads.
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Multiple Issues and Other Controls
Given that there is variation in the number of bonds issued by each firm during the sample
period, one could argue that firms with many issues in a year tend to receive too much weight
while firms with only a few issues per year receive too little weight in the estimation. To
address this concern, I follow Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) and Ortiz-Molina (2006)
and I restrict the sample to allow only one issue per firm-year. For firms with multiple issues
in a given year, I select the bond with the largest amount issued. I also restrict the sample to
the last bond issued by the firm, since that bond may convey the most relevant information
about the firm. The results persist for both procedures.
In order to control for industry-specific changes in the economic environment from one
year to another, which could affect industry risk I also interact industry and year dummies.
This procedure also does not change my previous results. The results are not reported for
brevity.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that connects product market competition to bond credit
spreads. The main finding is that firms operating in more dynamic environments have
significantly higher cost of debt financing. Overall, the results confirm that there product
markets and financial markets are linked together. Also, the analysis suggests that there
might be potential spill-over effects on industry rivals that need to be taken into account
when evaluating firm’s cost of debt.
My analysis also shows that information about product markets is incorporated in the
bond credit ratings. Together, these findings suggest that product market threats are being
reflected in corporate debt prices and that product market dynamics influence firms’ access
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to capital. Overall, this study adds to previous work by showing that lenders rationally price
bond issues using the information about the firm’s product market dynamics.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics. This table presents summary statistics for corporate
bonds, issuing firms’ characteristics and for proxies for product market competition. I present
means, medians, standard deviations of the variables. The sample period is from 1997 to
2011.
Panel A: Bond characteristics
count mean sd min p50 max
Spread (basis points) 22,346 306 325 2.04 206 2,743
Yield 22,346 .0689 .0342 .00377 .0643 .359
Bond maturity (in days) 22,346 3,784 3,991 366 2,593 36,525
Bond size (in M USD) 22,346 392,957 351,551 500 299,500 2500000
Bond size (to total assets) 22,346 .0617 .0842 .0000356 .0312 .708
Coupon 22,346 7.16 1.68 .75 7 14.5
Callable dummy 22,346 .73 .444 0 1 1
High Yield 21,967 .33 .47 0 0 1
Observations 22346
Panel B: Firm characteristics and product market competition proxies
count mean sd min p50 max
Fluidity 7,575 6.44 3.57 .381 5.6 24.7
Compustat HHI 7,536 .291 .215 .0426 .227 1
HHI Dummy 7,536 .273 .446 0 0 1
4-Firm Concentration Ratio 7,536 .773 .194 .314 .814 1
Assets - Total 7,575 10,851 26,145 57.3 3,574 479,921
Leverage 7,575 .356 .176 .000526 .329 1
Long-term debt 7,575 .322 .176 0 .291 .995
Cash flow 7,575 .0876 .0887 -.674 .0881 .474
Tangibility 7,575 .349 .242 .00169 .289 .965
Market-to-book 7,575 1.57 .796 .448 1.34 9.35
Profitability 7,563 .149 .0913 -.456 .142 .642
Default probability 7,076 .888 2.11 .0291 .235 17.8


















































Table 1.2: Correlation coefficients. This table provides correlation coefficients of key variables.
Spread (basis points) HHI HHI Dummy C4-Index Fluidity S&P Rating
Spread (basis points) 1
HHI -0.11 1
HHI Dummy 0.12 -0.55 1
C4-Index -0.11 0.78 -0.81 1
Fluidity 0.090 -0.24 0.29 -0.32 1
S&P Rating -0.58 0.20 -0.14 0.19 -0.16 1
Observations 15056
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Table 1.3: Bond credit spreads across quartiles of competition measures. Panel A
presents corporate average and median corporate bond yield spreads across quartile portfolios
based on Fluidity measure created by Hoberg et al. (2014). Higher values of Fluidity are
associated with higher levels of product market threats. In order to form quartile portfolios,
I sort bonds each year based on Fluidity ans assign bonds into quartiles. Next, I compute
average and median loan spreads for each quartile. Below, I report the difference in means
and medians between high product market threat quartile (Q4) and low product market
threat quartile (Q1) industries. Panel B presents corporate yield spreads across quartile
portfolios based on HHI. The quartile portfolios are formed using the Herfindhal-Hirschman
Index (HHI ) at the three-digit industry level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Higher values
of HHI are associated with lower level of competition. Panel C presents corporate yield
spreads across quartile portfolios based on 4-Firm Concentration Ratio. For all panels, I
compute the statistical significance of the difference in means with a mean comparison t-test
and the difference in medians with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The sample period is from
1997 to 2011. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗,
respectively.
Panel A: Corporate yield spreads across quartile portfolios based on Fluidity.
Fluidity quartile mean(spread) median(spread) obs
Lowest competition 260.70 169.96 5573
2 286.74 190.41 5592
3 315.75 214.93 5601
Highest competition 363.00 250.87 5584
Diff (4-1) 102.3∗∗∗ 80.91∗∗∗
Panel B: Corporate yield spreads across quartile portfolios based on HHI.
HHI quartile mean(spread) median(spread) obs
Lowest competition 261.36 172.46 5488
2 292.37 199.54 5554
3 294.12 200.16 5516
Highest competition 374.04 257.67 5721
Diff(4-1) 112.68∗∗∗ 85.21∗∗∗
Panel C: Corporate yield spreads across quartile portfolios based on C4-Index.
C4-Index quartile mean(spread) median(spread) obs
Lowest competition 268.56 182.81 5460
2 293.29 192.57 5496
3 289.71 197.53 5476
Highest competition 368.68 253.29 5847
Diff(4-1) 100.12∗∗∗ 70.48∗∗∗
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Table 1.4: Product market threats and the cost of debt: panel results. This table
presents coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of product market
threats on corporate bond spreads. The dependent variable is the logarithm of corporate
yield spreads.The sample period is from 1997 to 2011. I report t-statistics in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. The standard errors are calculated using the robust estimator
clustered at the firm level.
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Panel A: Fluidity
(1) (2) (3)
No fixed effects Fixed effects Fama-MacBeth
Fluidity 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗
(6.58) (5.08) (8.96)
Leverage 0.705∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(4.51) (7.04) (7.79)
Market-to-book -0.222∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(-9.33) (-8.77) (-8.14)
Log(total assets) -0.248∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(-13.05) (-16.81) (-12.31)
Tangibility -0.128 -0.0688 -0.123∗
(-1.49) (-0.77) (-1.96)
Profitability -1.276∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗ -1.059∗∗∗
(-5.45) (-9.51) (-3.24)
Coupon 0.141∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(13.00) (19.29) (16.24)
Log(bond size) 0.0263 -0.0713∗∗∗ -0.0749∗∗
(0.96) (-3.54) (-2.85)
Log(bond maturity) 0.139∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(9.40) (15.54) (3.62)
Turnover 0.0226∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗
(2.41) (4.60) (2.51)
Constant -4.083∗∗∗ -4.706∗∗∗ -3.590∗∗∗
(-14.02) (-21.77) (-7.45)
Year FE No Yes No
Industry FE No Yes No
Observations 14451 14434 14451
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.665
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Panel B: HHI Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
No fixed effects Fixed effects Fama-MacBeth
HHI Dummy 0.204∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(4.70) (3.12) (8.46)
Leverage 0.726∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(4.47) (7.23) (7.97)
Market-to-book -0.234∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(-9.59) (-9.19) (-8.42)
Log(total assets) -0.233∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(-11.99) (-16.15) (-13.36)
Tangibility -0.169∗∗ -0.120 -0.122∗∗
(-2.05) (-1.28) (-2.39)
Profitability -1.360∗∗∗ -1.621∗∗∗ -1.213∗∗∗
(-5.84) (-10.04) (-3.88)
Coupon 0.145∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(13.42) (19.77) (15.84)
Log(bond size) 0.0442 -0.0698∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗
(1.58) (-3.58) (-2.40)
Log(bond maturity) 0.139∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(9.12) (15.49) (3.57)
Turnover 0.0173∗ 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗
(1.81) (4.07) (2.34)
Constant -4.264∗∗∗ -4.609∗∗∗ -3.735∗∗∗
(-14.63) (-21.29) (-7.68)
Year FE No Yes No
Industry FE No Yes No
Observations 14417 14400 14417
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.663
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Panel C: Four-firm Concentration Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
No fixed effects Fixed effects Fama-MacBeth
4-Firm Concentration Ratio -0.364∗∗∗ -0.220∗ -0.329∗∗∗
(-3.35) (-1.94) (-4.32)
Leverage 0.764∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗
(4.78) (7.26) (7.49)
Market-to-book -0.228∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(-9.45) (-9.12) (-8.07)
Log(total assets) -0.230∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(-11.80) (-15.34) (-14.24)
Tangibility -0.195∗∗ -0.107 -0.142∗∗
(-2.35) (-1.14) (-2.89)
Profitability -1.362∗∗∗ -1.610∗∗∗ -1.216∗∗∗
(-5.79) (-9.98) (-3.92)
Coupon 0.146∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(13.30) (19.27) (16.03)
Log(bond size) 0.0472∗ -0.0682∗∗∗ -0.0578∗∗
(1.68) (-3.46) (-2.34)
Log(bond maturity) 0.138∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(8.98) (15.33) (3.55)
Turnover 0.0200∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0436∗∗
(2.09) (4.13) (2.32)
Constant -4.018∗∗∗ -4.456∗∗∗ -3.487∗∗∗
(-12.95) (-18.84) (-7.12)
Year FE No Yes No
Industry FE No Yes No
Observations 14417 14400 14417
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.662
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Product market threats and the cost of debt: panel results. Robustness.
This table presents coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of product
market threats on corporate bond spreads. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
corporate yield spreads. The sample period is from 1997 to 2011. I report t-statistics in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The standard errors are calculated using the
robust estimator clustered at the firm level.
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Panel A: Fluidity
(1) (2) (3)
Default Probability Credit Ratings Additional Controls
Fluidity 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗
(5.35) (3.86) (7.17)
Leverage 0.585∗∗∗ 0.174∗ 0.702∗∗∗
(4.46) (1.82) (4.61)
Market-to-book -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(-4.48) (-5.28) (-9.31)
Log(total assets) -0.236∗∗∗ -0.0834∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(-15.80) (-5.73) (-13.29)
Tangibility -0.117 -0.0844 -0.122
(-1.34) (-1.21) (-1.49)
Profitability -1.282∗∗∗ -0.698∗∗∗ -1.433∗∗∗
(-6.98) (-5.25) (-6.35)
Coupon 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(18.59) (13.86) (13.91)
Log(bond size) -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0937∗∗∗ 0.0233
(-3.71) (-5.45) (0.86)
Log(bond maturity) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(13.43) (17.65) (9.79)
Turnover 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.00479 0.0407∗∗∗
(3.97) (0.74) (4.38)














Constant -4.260∗∗∗ -4.187∗∗∗ -4.210∗∗∗
(-18.70) (-20.37) (-15.02)
Year FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes No
Observations 12331 12080 14451
Adjusted R2 0.671 0.716 0.383
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Panel B: HHI Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Default Probability Credit Ratings Additional Controls
HHI Dummy 0.136∗∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(2.97) (2.67) (4.80)
Leverage 0.564∗∗∗ 0.151 0.727∗∗∗
(4.21) (1.56) (4.56)
Market-to-book -0.121∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(-4.59) (-5.26) (-9.50)
Log(total assets) -0.233∗∗∗ -0.0794∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
(-15.54) (-5.48) (-12.04)
Tangibility -0.167∗ -0.119∗ -0.160∗∗
(-1.83) (-1.65) (-2.02)
Profitability -1.414∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗
(-7.40) (-5.44) (-6.69)
Coupon 0.163∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(18.92) (13.85) (14.37)
Log(bond size) -0.0753∗∗∗ -0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0432
(-3.60) (-5.30) (1.55)
Log(bond maturity) 0.164∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(13.47) (17.84) (9.42)
Turnover 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.00231 0.0346∗∗∗
(3.55) (0.35) (3.65)














Constant -4.157∗∗∗ -4.125∗∗∗ -4.405∗∗∗
(-18.03) (-20.22) (-15.68)
Year FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes No
Observations 12311 12060 14417
Adjusted R2 0.668 0.715 0.376
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Panel C: Four-firm Concentration Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Default Probability Credit Ratings Additional Controls
4-Firm Concentration Ratio -0.230∗∗ -0.150∗ -0.336∗∗∗
(-2.00) (-1.66) (-3.24)
Leverage 0.578∗∗∗ 0.158 0.763∗∗∗
(4.30) (1.63) (4.86)
Market-to-book -0.121∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗
(-4.63) (-5.31) (-9.31)
Log(total assets) -0.230∗∗∗ -0.0772∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(-14.79) (-5.15) (-11.86)
Tangibility -0.162∗ -0.115 -0.180∗∗
(-1.75) (-1.60) (-2.26)
Profitability -1.394∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗
(-7.36) (-5.41) (-6.60)
Coupon 0.164∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(18.54) (13.84) (14.25)
Log(bond size) -0.0741∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗ 0.0460
(-3.50) (-5.25) (1.63)
Log(bond maturity) 0.162∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(13.29) (17.62) (9.27)
Turnover 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.00269 0.0373∗∗∗
(3.61) (0.40) (3.91)














Constant -3.991∗∗∗ -4.025∗∗∗ -4.182∗∗∗
(-16.00) (-18.93) (-13.93)
Year FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes No
Observations 12311 12060 14417
Adjusted R2 0.667 0.714 0.372
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Product market competition and the cost of debt: new issues. This
table presents coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of product market
threats on corporate bond spreads. The dependent variable is the logarithm of corporate
yield spreads. I report t-statistics in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The
standard errors are calculated using the robust estimator clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Fluidity 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(6.04) (3.30)
HHI Dummy 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗
(4.31) (2.58)
4-Firm Concentration Ratio -0.225∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗
(-2.93) (-2.58)
Leverage 0.468∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(5.10) (5.23) (6.49) (6.33) (6.63) (6.33)
Market-to-book -0.131∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(-6.53) (-6.35) (-6.44) (-6.42) (-6.40) (-6.37)
Log(total assets) -0.171∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
(-7.46) (-8.32) (-7.63) (-9.48) (-7.49) (-9.45)
Tangibility 0.0637 0.0711 0.0790 -0.0135 0.0901∗ -0.0211
(1.24) (0.89) (1.56) (-0.17) (1.72) (-0.27)
Profitability -0.674∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗∗ -0.934∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗∗ -0.932∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗
(-4.02) (-4.26) (-5.57) (-5.72) (-5.51) (-5.69)
Coupon 0.286∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(13.07) (12.74) (14.34) (14.16) (14.37) (14.18)
Log(bond size) 0.0978∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0863∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0656∗∗
(3.51) (3.40) (2.86) (2.57) (2.70) (2.50)
Log(bond maturity) -0.00738 0.00582 -0.0180 -0.00461 -0.0186 -0.00532
(-0.30) (0.25) (-0.75) (-0.21) (-0.77) (-0.24)
Constant 7.643∗∗∗ 7.782∗∗∗ 7.949∗∗∗ 8.721∗∗∗ 8.276∗∗∗ 9.010∗∗∗
(24.30) (24.58) (23.17) (25.31) (21.76) (24.12)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4100 4095 5806 5799 5806 5799
Adjusted R2 0.588 0.596 0.556 0.571 0.556 0.571
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Credit ratings and competition. This table displays estimation results for
the ordered probit model and OLS model. The dependent variable is the S&P Credit Rating
for a given corporate bond converted into numerical identifiers 1 through 17 (AAA is 17).
I report t-statistics in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The standard errors are
calculated using the robust estimator clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




HHI Dummy -0.208∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗
(-2.31) (-2.93)
4-Firm Concentration Ratio 0.720∗∗∗ 1.521∗∗∗
(3.18) (3.50)
Leverage -2.518∗∗∗ -2.537∗∗∗ -2.584∗∗∗ -5.002∗∗∗ -5.134∗∗∗ -5.231∗∗∗
(-6.85) (-6.75) (-7.06) (-7.48) (-7.24) (-7.60)
Market-to-book 0.654∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗
(8.97) (8.88) (9.04) (10.50) (10.38) (10.55)
Log(total assets) 0.603∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 1.185∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗
(12.12) (11.03) (11.00) (13.60) (12.24) (12.37)
Tangibility -0.282∗ -0.273∗ -0.161 -0.607∗∗ -0.569∗ -0.348
(-1.75) (-1.66) (-0.97) (-2.04) (-1.88) (-1.16)
Profitability 3.165∗∗∗ 3.279∗∗∗ 3.282∗∗∗ 6.401∗∗∗ 6.738∗∗∗ 6.717∗∗∗
(7.03) (7.55) (7.60) (7.35) (7.85) (7.91)
Coupon -0.288∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.619∗∗∗ -0.622∗∗∗
(-13.97) (-14.32) (-14.45) (-14.21) (-14.95) (-14.94)
Log(bond size) -0.0712 -0.104∗ -0.103∗ -0.158 -0.224∗∗ -0.223∗∗
(-1.33) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.54) (-2.05) (-2.07)
Log(bond maturity) 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(6.10) (5.98) (5.97) (5.97) (5.91) (5.92)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13646 13614 13614 13646 13614 13614
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.216 0.217 0.693 0.680 0.683
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Rating fixed effects. The sample period is from 1997 to 2011. I report t-
statistics in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The standard errors are calculated
using the robust estimator clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fluidity 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(3.53) (3.48)
HHI Dummy 0.0893∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(3.54) (2.76)
4-Firm Concentration Ratio -0.157∗∗∗ -0.139
(-2.60) (-1.57)
Leverage 0.223∗∗ 0.155∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.146∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.154∗
(2.42) (1.81) (2.30) (1.73) (2.50) (1.81)
Market-to-book -0.0926∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0934∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0922∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(-6.31) (-7.03) (-6.29) (-7.10) (-6.21) (-7.07)
Log(total assets) -0.0841∗∗∗ -0.0974∗∗∗ -0.0763∗∗∗ -0.0908∗∗∗ -0.0753∗∗∗ -0.0896∗∗∗
(-5.40) (-6.77) (-4.99) (-6.59) (-4.85) (-6.21)
Tangibility -0.156∗∗∗ -0.0267 -0.177∗∗∗ -0.0641 -0.188∗∗∗ -0.0543
(-2.67) (-0.38) (-3.09) (-0.89) (-3.32) (-0.75)
Profitability -0.581∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗
(-3.96) (-6.03) (-3.90) (-6.24) (-3.86) (-6.20)
Coupon 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0936∗∗∗ 0.0947∗∗∗ 0.0941∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗∗
(14.55) (16.18) (14.56) (16.19) (14.70) (16.09)
Log(bond size) -0.0786∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗ -0.0723∗∗∗ -0.0739∗∗∗ -0.0718∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗
(-4.76) (-4.59) (-4.49) (-4.69) (-4.43) (-4.58)
Log(bond maturity) 0.198∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(18.36) (20.66) (18.30) (20.97) (18.15) (20.76)
Turnover 0.00694 -0.000548 0.00311 -0.00317 0.00365 -0.00283
(1.16) (-0.09) (0.51) (-0.53) (0.60) (-0.48)
Constant -5.535∗∗∗ -5.827∗∗∗ -5.650∗∗∗ -5.809∗∗∗ -5.531∗∗∗ -5.705∗∗∗
(-25.34) (-28.34) (-25.67) (-28.06) (-24.44) (-26.69)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14256 14239 14225 14208 14225 14208
Adjusted R2 0.705 0.716 0.705 0.716 0.704 0.715
t statistics in parentheses

















































Table 1.9: Public debt market access. Probit model. Dependent variable is equal to one if the firm has a bond
credit rating and zero otherwise. Firm size is the log of assets. Book leverage is the book value of debt divided by
total assets. Market-to-book is calculated as (total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) / total
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment)to total assets . Profitability is defined as
EBITDA/Assets. The stock return is measured as the percentage return over the last year. All independent variables
are lagged. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged
by one period. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct for correlation across

















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated 1=Rated
rating
Fluidity -0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗
(-8.02) (-7.81) (-2.01)
HHI Dummy -0.108∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.0312
(-2.51) (-2.41) (-0.67)
4-Firm Concentration Ratio 0.211∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.110
(2.19) (2.94) (0.99)
Size 0.888∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗
(41.69) (40.91) (39.51) (52.09) (48.16) (48.68) (51.88) (48.12) (48.62)
Leverage 3.038∗∗∗ 3.063∗∗∗ 2.848∗∗∗ 2.569∗∗∗ 2.553∗∗∗ 2.626∗∗∗ 2.570∗∗∗ 2.552∗∗∗ 2.626∗∗∗
(25.74) (25.39) (23.25) (29.58) (28.45) (28.18) (29.60) (28.44) (28.17)
Market-to-book -0.0392∗∗ -0.0489∗∗ -0.0922∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.0698∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0954∗∗∗ -0.0693∗∗∗
(-2.01) (-2.44) (-4.37) (-5.92) (-5.28) (-3.72) (-5.67) (-4.98) (-3.69)
Tangibility 0.413∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.0374 -0.294∗∗∗ 0.141∗ 0.0506 -0.290∗∗∗
(4.30) (4.33) (-2.11) (1.66) (0.44) (-2.68) (1.68) (0.59) (-2.64)
Profitability 0.900∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗ 0.141 0.0476 0.312∗∗ 0.114 0.0445
(5.76) (5.97) (2.99) (2.47) (1.02) (0.36) (2.37) (0.83) (0.34)
retan 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0261∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0563∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗
(3.26) (1.95) (3.78) (5.57) (5.05) (4.21) (5.48) (4.97) (4.19)
Constant -7.159∗∗∗ -7.160∗∗∗ -7.173∗∗∗ -6.469∗∗∗ -6.255∗∗∗ -5.946∗∗∗ -6.639∗∗∗ -6.549∗∗∗ -6.065∗∗∗
(-42.30) (-37.46) (-23.62) (-55.86) (-11.85) (-11.14) (-49.80) (-12.22) (-11.10)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 52663 52663 52438 85177 85176 84802 85177 85176 84802
Pseudo R2 0.587 0.591 0.628 0.578 0.590 0.599 0.578 0.590 0.599
t statistics in parentheses

















































Table 1.10: Debt-equity issuance. Probit model. Dependent variable is equal to one if the firm issued debt and zero if
the firm issued equity. Firm size is the log of assets. Book leverage is the book value of debt divided by total assets. Market-
to-book is calculated as (total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) / total assets. Tangibility is the
ratio of fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment)to total assets . Profitability is defined as EBITDA/Assets. The
stock return is measured as the percentage return over the last year. All independent variables are lagged. Models include
fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Models are
estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm.

















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E D vs. E
F.de
Fluidity -0.0463∗∗∗ -0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0513∗∗∗
(-11.02) (-11.09) (-9.36)
HHI Dummy -0.0289 -0.0516∗∗ 0.0112
(-1.13) (-1.99) (0.37)
4-Firm Concentration Ratio 0.650∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(11.06) (11.33) (4.52)
Size 0.173∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(20.08) (20.83) (18.44) (21.32) (21.14) (20.27) (21.19) (21.27) (20.37)
Leverage -0.177∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗
(-2.27) (-3.44) (-5.25) (-6.47) (-7.82) (-10.17) (-7.06) (-8.44) (-10.29)
Market-to-book -0.199∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(-16.24) (-16.84) (-13.68) (-22.34) (-22.41) (-19.90) (-21.61) (-21.76) (-19.76)
Tangibility -0.0576 -0.0658 0.248∗∗∗ 0.0633 0.0455 0.275∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(-0.84) (-0.96) (2.65) (1.19) (0.85) (4.17) (3.09) (2.84) (4.44)
Profitability 1.076∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗
(12.40) (10.66) (10.15) (20.78) (18.49) (16.28) (20.52) (18.18) (16.26)
retan -0.0690∗∗∗ -0.0640∗∗∗ -0.0672∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗ -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.0830∗∗∗ -0.0909∗∗∗ -0.0861∗∗∗ -0.0833∗∗∗
(-4.54) (-3.90) (-3.95) (-6.56) (-5.85) (-5.77) (-6.74) (-5.95) (-5.81)
Constant 0.341∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.150∗ 0.142
(5.81) (4.13) (2.90) (7.51) (5.22) (2.19) (-3.43) (-1.65) (0.67)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 12895 12895 12845 23315 23313 23226 23315 23313 23226
Pseudo R2 0.164 0.184 0.219 0.131 0.151 0.172 0.137 0.157 0.173
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Corporate yield spread and firm characteristics before and after a
reduction in import tariff rates. This table presents average corporate yield spreads
and firm characteristics before and after a large reduction of import tariff rates for large
firms. The tariff rate reduction is considered large if it is at least three times larger than a
median tariff rate reduction in that industry. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all
firms in the sample, Panel B presents statistics for a subset of large firms defined as having
their total asset size above the sample median and Panel C presents statistics for a subset
of large firms defined as having their total asset size below the sample median. The sample
period is from 1992 to 2005. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Panel A: All firms
Before After Difference t-stat
Spread 213.680 257.834 -44.154 -5.808∗∗∗
Default probability 0.540 0.564 -0.024 -0.550
Leverage 0.338 0.343 -0.005 -1.299
Observations 6784
Panel B: Large firms
Before After Difference t-stat
Spread 125.201 180.924 -55.723 -8.437∗∗∗
Default probability 0.268 0.439 -0.171 -4.796∗∗∗
Leverage 0.308 0.337 -0.029 -6.405∗∗∗
Observations 3563
Panel C: Small firms
Before After Difference t-stat
Spread 320.869 333.939 -13.070 -0.970
Default probability 0.862 0.683 0.179 2.234∗
Leverage 0.375 0.349 0.026 4.485∗∗∗
Observations 3221
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Table 1.12: Reductions of import tariff rates and the cost of public debt. This
table presents coefficient estimates of the effect of tariff rate reductions on corporate yield
spreads. The dependent variable is the logarithm of corporate yield spreads. In columns 1
equals one if industry j has experienced a tariff rate reduction by time t that is larger than
three times the median tariff rate reduction in that industry and zero otherwise. In column
2, Post Reduction equals one if industry j has experienced a tariff rate reduction by time
t that is larger than three times the average tariff rate reduction in that industry and zero
otherwise. The sample period is from 1994 to 2005. the standard errors are calculated using
the robust estimator and clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3)
abs(∆Tariff) > 3×median abs(∆Tariff) > 2×median abs(∆Tariff) > 3×mean
Post Reduction 0.112∗∗ 0.101∗ 0.0841∗
(1.99) (1.83) (1.69)
Leverage 0.0608 0.00636 0.0969
(0.33) (0.03) (0.52)
Market-to-book -0.0363 -0.0367 -0.0316
(-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.46)
Log(total assets) -0.0784∗∗ -0.0817∗∗ -0.0796∗∗
(-2.39) (-2.50) (-2.41)
Tangibility 0.0755 0.0416 0.0326
(0.50) (0.29) (0.23)
Profitability -0.793 -0.738 -0.739
(-1.64) (-1.49) (-1.49)
Coupon 0.113∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(7.06) (7.13) (7.00)
Log(bond size) -0.0726∗∗ -0.0687∗∗ -0.0718∗∗
(-2.36) (-2.21) (-2.30)
Log(bond maturity) 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(5.12) (5.10) (4.96)
Turnover -0.00201 -0.000858 -0.00188
(-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.14)
Default probability 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0500∗∗∗ 0.0510∗∗∗
(3.59) (3.67) (3.72)
S&P Rating -0.134∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(-10.64) (-10.42) (-10.58)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2894 2894 2894
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.643 0.643
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Variable Descriptions
The main sample of firms is obtained from Annual Compustat files. Stock prices and market
capitalizations are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Bond
transaction data is from the Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) and
National Association of Insurance Commissioners’s (NAIC) extracted from Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD). Bond characteristics are from Mergent FISD. Data on
foreign trade are acquired from Peter Schott’s Web site. Macroeconomic data are retrieved
from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Treasury bond data from Federal Reserve
Bank in St. Louis. Data on firm level default probability is obtained from Kamakura’s Risk
Manager.
Variable Description
Spread Bond yield based on the last price for a bond in the month minus the
relevant end-of-month Treasury yield for the bond.
Fluidity A measure of firm-level competitive threats based on the description
of firms’ product space and rival moves in their 10-K’s developed by
Hoberg et al. (2014).
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index computed using Compustat firms. It is
defined as the sum of squared market shares. Market shares are computed
using firms’ sales.
HHI Dummy An indicator variable which equals one if the HHI is in the lowest quartile
of the yearly sample distribution, and equals zero otherwise.
C4-Index 4-Firm Concentration Ratio is the sum of market shares of the four largest
firms in the industry.
Bond size Amount outstanding of a bond issue.
Bond maturity Bond maturity measured in days.
Total assets Total book assets in billions USD.
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
Profitability Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets.
Market-to-book (Debt in current liabilities + total long-term debt + preferred stock car-
rying value deferred taxes and investment tax credit + stock price at the
end of quarter x common shares outstanding) divided by total assets.
Leverage (Debt in current liabilities + total long term debt) divided by total assets.
Default probability Estimate of firms default probability based on Merton Structural Model.
Z-score 1.2(current assets - current liabilities)/total assets + 1.4(retained earn-
ings/total assets) + 3.3(pretax income/total assets) + 0.6(market capi-
talization/total liabilities) + 0.9(sales/total assets).
Credit spread Difference between the yields of a long-term Baa bond index and long-
term Aaa bond index.
Term spread Difference between a 10-year Treasury bond yield and a 1-year Treasury
bond yield.
S&P Rating S&P rating at the bond level. Ratings are converted to an ordinal scale
of 1-17, with 17 being the highest rated bond and 1 being the lowest
rated bond.
High Yield Dummy variable for a non-investment grade rating.
Turnover Natural logarithm of yearly turnover in percent of the total amount out-
standing.
Post Reduction Dummy variable equal to one if industry j has experienced a tariff re-
duction that is three times larger than the median tariff rate reduction
in that industry at time t.
Chapter 2
Industry Contagion in Bond Yield
Spreads
2.1 Introduction
This paper improves our understanding of intra-industry information transfer effects re-
sulting from the bond rating changes of industry participants. Specifically, it explores the
question of whether the credit rating change of one firm affects the cost of debt capital of
its rivals. Thus, the goal of this paper is to analyze the effect of credit rating upgrades and
downgrades of single firms on the bond spreads of its industry competitors. Additionally,
I examine if there are any differences as to how rivals are affected by the rating change based
on several cross-sectional factors.
Bond ratings provide information on the creditworthiness of corporate bond issues. The
ratings reflect the credit agency’s opinions of the risk that a company will default on its bond
payments. Credit ratings have the potential to convey information to the market about the
quality of a company that is not in the public domain, since credit agencies receive non-
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public information from the rated firms (Kisgen, 2007). Thus, market reactions to rating
announcements are to be expected.1
Previous studies confirm that bond credit ratings convey new information about the
affected firm and that rating adjustments result in significant changes in the rated firm’s
stock prices (Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts, 1987;
Ederington and Goh, 1998). In general, studies find evidence that market reactions to credit
rating downgrades and upgrades are asymmetric, with significant reactions to downgrades
and little or no reaction to upgrades, which appear to be anticipated. (Dichev and Piotroski,
2001; Zaima and McCarthy, 1988).
Another stream of research investigates information transfers across firms for corporate
events. Specific announcements about a single firm contain signals about the whole indus-
try. However, most prior research into intra-industry information transfer focuses mostly
on short-term stock price reactions and changes of the CDS spreads of industry rivals.
Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (1997) explore the potential secondary impact of bond rating
changes on stock returns. Akhigbe, Borde, and Whyte (2003) and Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl
(2010) find industry-wide effects resulting from a firm’s initial public offerings. In addition,
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1992) find competitors’ share price reactions are affected
by SEOs in their industry. Similarly, Lang and Stulz (1992) look at the effects of a firm’s
bankruptcy announcement on its industry rivals and find two distinct types of effects, con-
tagion and competition.
Contagion implies that a negative credit event will impact industry rivals negatively,
1”Credit ratings are forward-looking opinions about credit risk. Standard & Poor’s credit ratings express
the agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a corporation or state or city
government, to meet its financial obligations in full and on time. The reasons for ratings adjustments vary,
and may be broadly related to overall shifts in the economy or business environment or more narrowly focused
on circumstances affecting a specific industry, entity, or individual debt issue (...) The reasons for ratings
adjustments vary, and may be broadly related to overall shifts in the economy or business environment
or more narrowly focused on circumstances affecting a specific industry, entity, or individual debt issue.”
(http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/eu)
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whereas a positive credit events will impact the rivals positively. This is because the event
will reveal new information about shocks to cash flows that are common across the industry.
A contagion effect may also be due to counterparty risk, meaning that the change of the
financial position of a firm may impact other firms that have business relationship with that
firm, e.g. a supplier or a creditor. Finally, a contagion effect may result from a change in the
market’s perception of the entire industry, which may prompt investors to require higher or
lower rates of return on their investment. Conversely, the presence of a a competition effect
implies that a negative credit event for one firm will positively impact this firm’s industry
rivals, while a positive credit event will have negative impact on the rivals. This is because
these rivals may be affected by a resulting change in industry and, as a result, may be gaining
or losing market power.
Both contagion and competitive effects have been observed following a corporate bankrupt-
cies. Lang and Stulz (1992) provide evidence that a bankruptcy announcement has both
contagion and competitive effect on other firms in the industry. The authors find that the
competitive effect is dominant in industries typified by low leverage ratios and low levels of
competition. Jorion and Zhang (2007a) also analyze the effects of Chapter 11 and Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcies in concentrated and competitive industries. Using CDS spreads, they
document that industry rivals are affected negatively by a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which
involves reorganization of the company. This finding is consistent with the contagion effect.
However, they also find that industry rivals are positively affected by Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
which involves liquidation of the company. This, in turn, is consistent with the competition
effect.
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) subsequently examined the vertical effects of
bankruptcies and show that multiple suppliers to firms filing for bankruptcy experience
negative stock price reactions around the filing. These findings are consistent with the con-
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tagion effect. More recently, Hertzel and Officer (2012) study contagion effects of corporate
bankruptcies on corporate loans and show that spreads on bank loans are significantly higher
when the loan is originated or renegotiated in the two years surrounding the bankruptcy filing
of an industry rival. They also show that this effect is mitigated in concentrated industries.
Contagion and competition effects have also been observed in response to credit rat-
ing changes. Indeed this paper advances and strengthens the findings of Jorion and Zhang
(2010) Caton and Goh (2003) and Akhigbe et al. (1997). Akhigbe et al. (1997) study eq-
uity market reaction to the credit rating change and conclude that the stock market does
respond to bond credit rating downgrades and that this response is spread from individual
firms to the corresponding industry rivals. In the same spirit, Caton and Goh (2003) study
the implications of ratings downgrades for earnings forecasts and find that stock analysts
revise their earnings expectations downward for rivals of companies with downgraded debt.
Jorion and Zhang (2010) expand the analysis of Akhigbe et al. (1997) by conditioning their
result on the rating before the firm was downgraded. By doing so, Jorion and Zhang (2010)
observe both contagion and competition effects. They confirm that the bond rating down-
grade of investment grade firms results in negative abnormal stock returns for its industry
rivals. This information transfer effect is consistent with the contagion effect. However, the
downgrade of speculative grade firms results in positive abnormal stock returns are consistent
with the competition effect. Thus, the negative credit events of speculative grade firms will
positively affect other firms in the industry.2
In this paper I examine the bond market response to credit rating changes. This pa-
per contributes to the literature by confirming that a firm’s credit ratings adjustments can
significantly impact its industry rivals’ cost of debt. My findings establish a link between
credit ratings adjustments and corporate bond pricing and confirm that there are spillover
2This result is consistent with Brander and Lewis (1988) who argue that external benefits to firm’s rivals
increase with the extent of financial distress to the company.
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effects between market rivals. These effects, in turn, have implications for the firm’s financial
decisions.3 My study complements recent papers that document how corporate behavior is
influenced by the decisions of firms’ rivals (MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Leary and Roberts,
2014). This paper also extends recent research into corporate bond pricing which seeks to
identify what factors affect bond credit spreads (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Elton et al.,
2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Chen et al., 2007; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). I find that
corporate bond pricing is subject to contagion effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the development
of the hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the data, presents the summary statistics, and
describes the empirical strategy. Section 2.4 presents the main results and sensitivity tests.
Section 2.5 presents the paper’s conclusions.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
Credit rating changes by credit rating agencies convey information about the industry. In
this paper I examine whether this effect is reflected in bond yield spreads. Prior studies find
that credit rating downgrades and upgrades have effects on the stock and bond prices of the
adjusted firm (Hand et al., 1992; Ederington et al., 1987; Ederington and Goh, 1998). The
studies find asymmetric results with respect to rating change downgrades and upgrades. The
effect of upgrades is found to be weaker or even insignificant. Thus, my first hypothesis is
meant to test and confirm the presence of these results in my sample of bond credit spreads.
As a result of a credit rating change, I expect the cost of debt for downgraded firms to
3Kisgen (2006) examines bond credit ratings in the context of capital structure. He looks at the costs and
benefits of a credit rating adjustments and finds that rating changes directly affect firms’ financing decisions.
Kisgen (2009) extends that research showing by studying firms’ behavior after the rating adjustments and
finds that firms reduce leverage following credit rating downgrades. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) show that
regulations based on credit ratings that constrain bond investment affect yields and thus firms’ cost of capital.
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increase, and the cost of debt for upgraded firms is expected to decrease. Thus, I formulate
my first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Bond rating downgrade (upgrade) has a positive (negative) effect on bond
yield spreads of publicly traded firms.
While Hypothesis 1 focus the impact of bond rating changes on the affected firms, the next
set of hypotheses relates to the spillover effect of the information contained in bond rating
changes on industry rivals.
A downgrade for one firm can be either good or bad news for the rival firm. It can be good
news since the deterioration of the financial position of a competitor may limit its ability
to fund expansion, R&D, increase its costs, and potentially lead to its elimination. The
decrease in competitive strength might, in turn, decrease the cost of their debt; consistent
with a competition effect. A credit rating downgrade of a firm can also be bad news to
its rivals if it conveys information about adverse economic conditions for the industry and
increases the rival firms’ probability of credit rating downgrade. This would result in an
increase in the cost of debt for rivals of downgraded firms, consistent with the contagion
effect.
Similarly, a credit rating upgrade can be good or bad news for the rival firm. It can be
good news if it signals favorable economic conditions for the industry, while it can also be bad
news if it is the result of a competitor’s improved financial position and acquisition of a larger
market share. Lastly, an alternative hypothesis posits that the credit rating downgrade is
firm specific and does not convey any new information that is relevant for industry rivals.
Hypothesis 2: Bond rating downgrades (upgrades) have a positive (negative) effect on
the bond yield spreads of publicly traded firms in the same industry.
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Hypothesis 3: Bond rating downgrades (upgrades) have a negative (positive) effect on
the bond yield spreads of publicly traded firms in the same industry.
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 focus on the impact of rating changes on the bond credit spread of
the affected firm and on the impact of the same rating change on the affected firms’ industry
rivals. The next hypothesis, Hypothesis 4, focus on differences in these effects across firms.
I expect the factors which explain the cross-sectional variation of bond credit spread changes
to include: the ex ante bond rating level, product market structure, opacity and relative
firm size.
Firms operating in industries with lower bond ratings are expected to be affected more
by the credit rating adjustments of their industry rivals. Also, I expect the effect of credit
rating adjustments on industry rivals to be greater for firms that are more opaque. Similarly,
the smaller firms in the industry are expected to be more affected by credit rating changes
of rival firms.
If the company operates in more competitive industry, I expect the contagion effect of
the rival firm’s credit rating adjustment to be stronger. In more concentrated industries,
the increase of market share due to the rival competitor’s downgrade is more likely therefore
I expect the competition effect to dominate.
The effect of credit ratings adjustments should also depend on original credit quality of
adjusted firm. Larger, investment grade firms are more likely to be perceived as industry
leaders. Therefore, I expect the effect of their rating adjustment to be more significant
than the effects of rating adjustments of smaller, speculative-grade firms. Moreover, the
investment grade firms are larger in size and have more relationships with counterparties
who require less credit protection from them (Jorion and Zhang, 2007b).
Hypothesis 4: Relative firm size, product market structure, opacity and rating level are
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significant determinants of cross-sectional variation in bond credit spread changes after
credit rating changes.
2.3 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Sample
The data for this study come from several sources. In order to be included in the sample,
the firm has to be present in Annual Compustat files. Following the standard approach, I
exclude firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4999). I also
exclude firms with values of total assets or sales are less than one million dollars and replace
extreme observations of all ratio variables with missing values (those in one percent in both
tails of the distribution). Leverage ratios are trimmed at the value one.
In order to construct bond prices, I use bond transaction data from the Transaction
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database which reports individual bond trans-
actions at a daily (or finer) frequency. The TRACE database initiated in 2002, became fully
operational in 2005 and now covers essentially all publicly traded bonds (Bessembinder et al.,
2006; Edwards et al., 2007).4
Since the TRACE database provides me with a short time series of data, I extend the
sample with data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’s (NAIC) bond
transaction file, which cover all insurance companies’ trading records of publicly traded
bonds in the post-1994 period. NAIC data is obtained from Mergent Fixed Income Secu-
rities Database (FISD). Insurance companies hold between one-third and 40% of corporate
bonds, therefore NAIC data represent a substantial portion of the corporate bond market
4See FINRA news release http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P013274.
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Campbell and Taksler (2003); Bessembinder et al. (2006). I eliminate canceled, corrected,
and commission trades as described in Dick-Nielsen (2009) and Bessembinder et al. (2009).
I also eliminate observations that are data entry errors, e.g. with negative prices, with
maturity dates prior to issuance or trade dates, etc.
Mergent’s FISD portion of the database contains a comprehensive set of bond character-
istics. I use FISD to obtain bond-level information such as issue date, issuance size, coupon
rate, and credit rating, as well as to identify the special features of bonds. I exclude all con-
vertible bonds, pay-in-kind bonds, asset-backed securities, Yankee bonds, Canadian bonds,
bonds denominated in non-U.S. currencies, floating-rate bonds, unit deals, puttable bonds,
exchangeable bonds, perpetual bonds and agency bonds from my sample.
In order to create the sample of bond credit spreads I first calculate bond prices using the
combined TRACE and NAIC dataset, I follow the methodology as in Bessembinder et al.
(2009). I eliminate all trades that are below $ 100,000 and construct a daily price by weighing
each trade by its size. For my sample, I retain the last daily price available for a given bond
that is closest to the end of the fiscal year, provided that the difference between the last trade
date and the end of the fiscal year is less than 90 days. Next, I use these prices to calculate
yield to maturity. In tests of new bond issues, I employ the promised yield to maturity at
issue reported by Mergent FISD. For my sample, I retain the last daily price available for a
given bond that is closest to the end of the fiscal year, provided that the difference between
the last trade date and the end of the fiscal year is less than 90 days.
Information on stock prices, trading volume, and market capitalizations are obtained from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). S&P credit ratings are obtained from
Compustat database.5 Treasury bond data is obtained from Federal Reserve Bank in St.
Louis. Information on the number of analysts is obtained from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S
5In unreported regressions, I repeat the analysis using S&P and Moody’s credit ratings at the bond level
from Mergent and obtain very similar results.
CHAPTER 2. INDUSTRY CONTAGION IN BOND YIELD SPREADS 58
database.
2.3.2 Variables
Measuring bond yield spreads
My first dependent variable is the change in bond yield spread, measures the cost of debt
(Elton et al., 2001; Klock et al., 2005). The yield spread is defined as the difference be-
tween the yield-to-maturity on a corporate bond and the yield-to-maturity on its maturity-
equivalent risk-free bond. To calculate yield spreads for individual corporate bonds, I use the
constant maturity Benchmark Treasury rates as risk-free rates. Since the rates are available
for maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 30 years, I perform a linear interpolation between the
two closest maturity matches to estimate the entire yield curve. In my analysis, I follow the
literature and use the natural logarithm of the yield spread to control for skewness (Valta,
2012)
Bond credit rating variables
I measure the bonds’ credit rating by the the S&P credit ratings that assess the creditwor-
thiness of the obligor with respect to its debt obligations. There are 22 ratings ranging from
highest (AAA) to lowest (D) in the S&P rating sample. I convert the letter ratings into
numerical equivalents using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the lowest rated firms (D) to
22 for the highest rated firms (AAA).
A sample of rivals in the corresponding industries of the firms subject to a credit rating
change is identified based on a three digit SIC code.6 The median number of rivals in the
6In a series of unreported regressions I repeat the analysis in this paper using four digit SIC codes. The
results are virtually unchanged.
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industry is seven.
Control variables
I selected a number of explanatory variables based on prior research on the determinants of
corporate bond spreads and credit ratings. The studies typically explain bond spreads in
terms of issue characteristics, issuer characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Therefore,
in my study, I control for several macroeconomic, bond-specific, and firm-specific proxies for
common default and recovery risk factors. This is to verify that known determinants of
credit spreads do not drive my results. Table 2.11 provides the list of all variables with brief
descriptions.
All of my regressions control for the characteristics of the bond issued. Since the increase
in leverage makes the bond riskier, then the issue size relative to firm’s assets should be
related to higher yield spread (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel, 1999). Longer maturity
debt is subject to greater interest rate risk exposure and can have a higher default risk.
What is more, longer maturities may make it easier for shareholders to gain at the expense
of the bondholders by means of selecting riskier projects. Therefore, the relationship between
a bond’s maturity and yield spreads is expected to be negative (Ortiz-Molina, 2006).
Following Elton et al. (2004) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) I include bond coupon
rate in my analysis. Throughout most of the period used in our study the tax rates on
capital gains and interest income were the same, but since capital gains are paid at the time
of sale, bonds with lower coupons may be more valuable due to the fact that some taxes are
postponed until the time of sale and because the holder of the bond has control over when
these taxes are paid.
To control for firm-specific variation, I use accounting variables similar to measures used in
Campbell and Taksler (2003); Klock et al. (2005), and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012). High levels
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of profitability, measured as operating income to sales indicate that the firm is financially
healthy and are expected to be associated with a low yield spread. On the other hand, high
levels of leverage are expected to to be associated with a higher yield spread, as higher debt
usage is associated with an increase on the probability of default and therefore a higher cost of
debt financing. Firm size is measured as the natural log of total assets and is expected to be
negatively related to yield spreads, as larger firms are generally considered safer investments
because of larger asset bases, higher likelihood of diversified assets, greater proportion of
tangible assets and overall better chances of survival in the long run (Ortiz-Molina, 2006).
Because investment in fixed capital is easily observable and can provide for good collateral,
firms with high levels of tangible assets are generally considered less risky, Therefore, I expect
asset tangibility to be negatively correlated with yield spreads.
2.3.3 Specifications
To test the relation between credit rating adjustments and bond yields and ratings, I use
the following general specification.
log(yi,t)− log(yi,t−1) = φ1Firm downgradei,t−1 + φ2Firm upgradei,t−1+
+κ1Industry downgradej,t−1 + κ2Industry upgradej,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + αt + ǫi,t
(2.1)
Subscripts i, and t, represent the firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable
yi,t is the logarithm of the bond yield spread. My primary interest is in the marginal ef-
fect of credit rating changes on bond credit spreads of the firms in the industry κ1 and κ2.
Industry downgrade and Industry upgrade are dummy variables indicating that there has
been a credit rating downgrade in the industry and credit rating upgrade in the industry,
respectively. Firm Downgrade and Firm upgrade indicate that the particular firm’s respec-
tive credit rating was downgraded or upgraded. The vector Xi,t−1 includes control variables
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at firm level. Because yield spreads may vary through time, I include a set of year dummy
variables αt in some of my regressions to capture the potential effects of changes in macroe-
conomic environment or term structure that may affect the yield spread in a particular year.
Depending on the specification, I also include industry fixed effects, firm fixed effects and
rating dummies.
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents bond and firm characteristics of the sample. The total number of firms
in the sample is 1108 and the number of firm-years is 6,219. One firm has about 5 bonds
issued, on average. Bond characteristics from Mergent FISD are available at the bond level,
therefore, weighing by value of outstanding bonds, I calculate average bond characteristics
by firm-year: spread, maturity, and the coupon rate. Panel A reports statistics for the whole
sample, while Panels B and C include figures for investment-grade and speculative grade,
respectively. The median yield spread in the sample is 281 and the mean spread is 386 basis
points. For investment-grade bonds, the yield spread is around 140 basis points and the me-
dian spread on speculative-grade bonds is around 431 basis points. The variation in coupon
rates is smaller, with most coupons falling into 6.5 to 8.8% range. The median maturity of
firm’s bonds is 2,667 days. A median firm that holds corporate debt has issued around $483
million in bonds and has $3,729 million in total assets. A median investment-grade firm
has $825 million corporate bonds outstanding and $8,174 million in total assets, whereas a
median speculative-grade has $350 million in bonds outstanding and $2,004 million in total
assets. The mean and median leverage ratio for the full sample is 36% 33%, respectively.
Investment grade firms have mean leverage ratio of 28% and median leverage ratio of 26%,
whereas speculative grade firms have mean leverage ratio of 42% and median leverage ratio
of 40%. The mean and median market to book is lower for speculative grade firms (1.33
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and 1.2 respectively) than for investment grade firms (1.85 and 1.58). Tangibility is higher
for speculative grade firms (mean 38.7%, median 34.6%) than for speculative grade firms
(mean 34%, median 28.6%). Profitability (ROA) is higher for investment grade firms with
the mean of 17.1% (median 16.3%) in comparison to speculative grade firms with the mean
of 13.2% (median 12.3%).
Table 2.2 presents a distribution of rating adjustments by year. The data sample spans
from 1997 to 2011. I identify the initial sample of downgrades from Compustat, which
provides information on ratings from Standard & Poor’s. Table 2.3 displays a distribution of
rating adjustments by rating level. Almost each rating category has exhibited upgrade and




In order to analyze the effect of rating changes on the cost of debt capital, I first run a series
of contemporaneous regressions. Table 2.4 contains the results of ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions examining the effects of credit rating adjustments on bond yield spreads,
holding borrower, market and bond characteristics constant. The dependent variable in all
regressions is the the first difference of the bond credit spread.7
The key independent variables of interest are dummy variables that are used to indicate
whether the firm was downgraded or upgraded (Firm downgrade and Firm upgrade) and
the two dummies indicating the downgraded or upgraded firm’s rivals Industry downgrade
7I use the logarithm of spreads to address the problem of skewness in the data. Using levels does not
alter the results.
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and Industry upgrade. Table 2.4 includes both the independent variables of interest that
are contemporaneous and lagged one period. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 we contempo-
raneously observe higher bond yield spread for firms that has been downgraded and lower
bond spread for the firms that have been upgraded. At the same time there is no significant
contemporaneous effect on industry rivals. This suggests that there is no immediate effect
of bond rating changes on industry peers.
However, the positive coefficient of on Industry downgrade (t-1) indicates that the firms
whose rival was downgraded experience an increased cost of debt capital in the subsequent
period. Column 2 is my baseline regression and it shows the coefficient of 0.0433. This
suggests that if there is a credit rating downgrade in the industry, the rival firm’s credit
yield spread This points to contagion effect around credit rating downgrades that is consistent
with Hypothesis 2. The effect of Industry upgrade (t-1) is insignificant. This implies that the
upgrades do not reveal any new information for industry rivals. This is consistent with the
literature which finds that spillover effects of credit rating upgrades are much less significant
than that of downgrades or altogether insignificant.
All results are reported with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by
firm. The results in column 1 include year fixed effects. In column 2 I include industry fixed
effects and in column 3 firm fixed effects. Column 4 includes rating fixed effects.
2.4.2 Ratings of Rivals
Column 1 and column 2 of table 2.5 presents the results for investment-grade and non-
investment grade, respectively. Next, consistent with Jorion and Zhang (2007b) the results
indicate that the impact is only significant for firms with speculative grade ratings. The
result of a credit rating change of an industry rival is not significant for firms which are
investment grade. This is because
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2.4.3 Relative Size of Rivals
I compare the size of each industry rival with the size of a firm subject to a ratings adjustment
and categorize rivals into large and small rivals. Large rivals are defined as firms that are
larger than the adjusted firm and small rivals are defined as firms that are smaller than
the adjusted firm. I test if larger and smaller rivals react differently to the news about the
adjustment. I expect the effect of rating adjustment to be more significant on the rivals that
are smaller than the firm subject to the rating adjustment.
In order to test the relationship between rivals’ credit yield spreads and their relative
size I include a set of dummy variables indicating whether the firm is larger than the
downgraded or upgraded industry rival. Table 2.6 presents the results. I find that the
intra-industry effect varies across the relative size of rival and announcing firms. Similar to
Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010) I find that firm downgrades create contagion effect on small
industry rivals. It appears that smaller rivals are more vulnerable than their larger coun-
terparts to credit rating downgrades. I find no effect on credit rating upgrades, which is
consistent with my previous results.
2.4.4 Level of Competitiveness in the Industry
Next, I examine the effect of industry concentration on bond credit spread contagion.
Brander and Lewis (1988) imply that industries with less competition should benefit more
from financial deterioration of one of the firms in the industry because the remaining firms
will be gaining more market power. Lang and Stulz (1992) shows that, in concentrated in-
dustries, bankruptcy filings have positive consequences for rivals. Hertzel and Officer (2012)
find some that contagion is mitigated in concentrated industries. Therefore, I expect the
effects of credit rating adjustments to be stronger in less concentrated, more competitive
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industries.
In order to examine whether the level of competition has any effect on industry rivals of
a company which ratings were upgraded or downgraded I divide the sample into two groups
based on the Herfindahl-Hirchmann index (HHI ). Table 2.7 presents the results of the effect
of competitiveness of the market on the credit yield spreads response to credit rating changes.
2.4.5 Information Opacity
Higher information opacity reflects the lower amount of publicly available information. Firms
covered by stock analysts are likely to be more informationally transparent. If other market
participants, such as equity analysts, do not have access to information about the firm, the
informational advantage of ratings agencies is enhanced (Jones, Lee, and McBrayer, 2015).
Therefore, the effect of credit rating adjustments should be stronger for firms with no equity
analyst following. I classify peer firms as transparent when the firm has at least one analyst,
and opaque, if no analyst is following the firm (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan,
2011).
Table 2.8 presents the results. Column 1 presents the results of the baseline regression for
transparent firms and column 2 presents the results for the sample of opaque firms. I find
that the bond credit spread is related to the opacity of the firms. Specifically, I find that
the effect on the credit yield spread is significant only for downgrades for informationally
opaque rivals. This is consistent with my prediction that informationally opaque firms will
have a stronger reaction to credit rating adjustments of their industry rivals.
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2.4.6 Rating of an Upgraded/Downgraded Firm
Next, I divide the downgraded companies into three subsamples based on the level of their
bonds’ pre- and post-adjustment bond rating. I distinguish between three groups. In group
1, both pre- and post-adjustment ratings are investment grade, regardless if I am analyzing
downgrades or upgrades. For group 2, pre-downgrade rating for downgrades is investment
grade and post-downgrade rating is non-investment grade. Conversely, for upgrades the
pre-upgrade rating is non-investment grade and post-upgrade rating is investment grade.
Finally, Group 3 is comprised of those bonds that are below investment grade in both the
pre- and post-adjustment periods. The results are presented in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10.
Again, I begin by measuring the effect of a credit rating change on the downgraded or
upgraded company itself. Table 2.9 presents the results. Column 2 shows that in con-
temporaneous regressions the bond - reacts to the news of a company credit rating being
downgraded by increasing the bond yield spread. What is more, the effect is stronger if
the company gets downgraded from investment to speculative grade. When a company gets
upgraded, the credit spread decreases, again, the effect is stronger if the firm is upgraded
from speculative to investment grade.
Table 2.10 presents the results for the rivals. The analysis shows that bond investors per-
ceive downgrades of high-rated firms as reflecting new information regarding the conditions
of an industry. The sign of the coefficient points to a contagion effect. On the other hand,
it seems that the upgrade in the industry also results in an increase of credit yield spread
for high rated firms and for firms that were upgraded from speculative to investment grade.
This may be due to a competition effect, where a rival upgraded to investment grade status
is perceived as a competitive threat to the firms in the industry.
Overall, the results suggest that investors perceive that credit rating adjustments, and
especially downgrades, of high-rated firms reflect new information about general conditions
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of the industry.
2.5 Conclusion
This article analyzes the information transfer effects of bond rating changes. Specifically,
I study the effect of bond rating adjustments on the pricing of corporate bonds. Prior
studies show that rating downgrades elicit significant stock and bond price responses of the
downgraded firm. They also document a stock price response experienced by the competitors
of the downgraded ore upgraded firm. This paper shows that rating changes in an industry
are also priced in the bond market. Specifically, I find that the bond yield spreads of industry
rivals are significantly higher if there has been a credit rating downgrade in the industry.
This is only true for investment-grade firms, speculative-grade debt downgrades seem to have
no effect on the industry rivals. Moreover, I find that the structure of the industry, relative
size of the firm and whether the firm is being followed by equity analysts are also significant
determinants of the bond yield change that occurred due to the credit rating downgrade of
an industry rival.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics. This table reports mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum of variables in my sample. Spread is bond yield based on the last
price for a bond in the month minus the relevant end-of-month Treasury yield for the bond
expressed in basis points. Maturity is bond maturity measured in days. Amount outstanding
is the size of a bond issue that is outstanding. Book leverage is the book value of debt
(DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets (AT). Market-to-book is calculated as [total assets
(AT) - book value of equity (CEQ) + market value of equity (PRCCF × CSHO]/total assets
(AT). Return on assets (ROA) is defined as EBITDA/Assets (OIBDP/AT). Tangibility is
the ratio of fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment)to total assets (PPENT/AT). Firm
size is the log of sales (SALE). The sample consists of 6216 firm-level observations of 1108
firms. The sample period covers years 1997 to 2011. Panel A includes all firms in the sample,
Panel B include firms categorized as investment grade (credit rating of BBB or above) and
Panel C includes firms categorized as speculative grade (credit rating of BBB- or below).
Panel A: Full sample (N=1107)
count mean sd min p50 max
Corporate bond spread (basis points) 6,216 386 382 1.24 281 3,088
Change in log(SPREAD) 4,660 .0402 .662 -4.7 .0159 3.99
Maturity (days) 6,216 3,189 2,146 379 2,667 35,860
Coupon 6,216 7.64 1.68 1.68 7.41 14.5
Amount outstanding 6,216 1,565 3,272 .025 483 42,123
Total assets 6,216 11,633 28,110 57.3 3,746 479,921
Leverage 6,216 .36 .177 .000526 .331 .998
Market-to-book 6,216 1.55 .78 .513 1.33 9.17
Tangibility 6,216 .366 .25 .00169 .31 .965
ROA 6,210 .149 .0928 -.456 .141 .642
Analyst 6,216 .847 .36 0 1 1
HHI 6,180 .088 .0759 .017 .0645 .744
Observations 6216
CHAPTER 2. INDUSTRY CONTAGION IN BOND YIELD SPREADS 69
Panel B: Investment grade bonds (N=521)
count mean sd min p50 max
Corporate bond spread (basis points) 2,698 198 233 1.24 140 2,922
Change in log(SPREAD) 2,057 .0243 .734 -4.7 -.0186 3.99
Maturity (days) 2,698 3,866 2,665 399 3,282 35,860
Coupon 2,698 6.65 1.37 1.68 6.63 14
Amount outstanding 2,698 2,371 4,166 .38 825 42,123
Total assets 2,698 19,575 35,480 57.3 8,174 448,507
Leverage 2,698 .28 .139 .000526 .26 .99
Market-to-book 2,698 1.85 .953 .57 1.58 9.17
Tangibility 2,698 .34 .223 .00205 .286 .961
ROA 2,698 .171 .0802 -.261 .163 .629
Analyst 2,698 .878 .328 0 1 1
HHI 2,683 .0899 .0835 .017 .0596 .744
Observations 2698
Panel C: Speculative grade bonds (N=795)
count mean sd min p50 max
Corporate bond spread (basis points) 3,518 531 410 41.1 431 3,088
Change in log(SPREAD) 2,603 .0527 .599 -2.13 .0311 2.78
Maturity (days) 3,518 2,670 1,439 379 2,483 17,919
Coupon 3,518 8.4 1.49 4.7 8.25 14.5
Amount outstanding 3,518 947 2,175 .025 350 41,395
Total assets 3,518 5,542 18,586 86 2,004 479,921
Leverage 3,518 .421 .179 .00163 .4 .998
Market-to-book 3,518 1.33 .512 .513 1.2 7.1
Tangibility 3,518 .387 .267 .00169 .346 .965
ROA 3,512 .132 .098 -.456 .123 .642
Analyst 3,518 .824 .381 0 1 1
HHI 3,497 .0865 .0694 .017 .0687 .744
Observations 3518
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Table 2.2: Distribution of of rating adjustments by year. This table shows the distri-
bution of the sample of credit rating adjustments from Compustat by year.
Year Downgrades Upgrades Downgrade in ind Upgrade in ind Obs
1996 0 0 0 0 20
1997 4 5 14 25 317
1998 27 27 90 126 385
1999 37 15 107 87 396
2000 33 16 127 84 338
2001 61 16 130 78 395
2002 72 22 171 92 475
2003 73 41 151 132 499
2004 59 40 155 146 479
2005 60 41 133 135 437
2006 67 48 173 157 442
2007 61 40 135 124 411
2008 59 38 72 87 361
2009 65 21 140 71 416
2010 33 55 114 161 442
2011 25 52 103 143 406
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Table 2.3: Distribution of of rating adjustments by rating level. This table shows
the distribution of the sample of credit rating adjustments from Compustat by rating level.
Rating Downgrades Upgrades Downgrade in ind Upgrade in ind Obs No of Firms
AAA 0 0 25 20 41 7
AA 3 3 37 32 95 18
AA- 9 3 21 15 78 29
A+ 9 11 46 36 219 66
A 30 24 129 94 491 116
A- 37 29 115 94 370 120
BBB+ 52 39 139 132 526 167
BBB 77 53 206 182 711 223
BBB- 73 47 139 120 575 201
BB+ 65 60 114 127 434 172
BB 67 66 181 163 593 238
BB- 83 60 245 217 712 292
B+ 80 48 172 164 606 262
B 71 20 111 125 363 182
B- 46 12 52 42 158 93
CCC+ 15 2 13 13 38 31
CCC 8 0 11 8 24 17
CC 4 0 1 2 5 4










































Table 2.4: Bond credit spread changes. Dummy variable Firm downgrade is assigned a value one if a firm has been
downgraded in the fiscal year t. Dummy variable Firm upgrade is assigned a value one if a firm has been upgraded
in the fiscal year t Competitor i belongs to the same industry as downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal year t of
the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value one if there was
a rating downgrade/upgrade in an industry. Book leverage is the book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total
assets (AT). Market-to-book is calculated as [total assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQ) + market value of equity
(PRCCF × CSHO]/total assets (AT). Return on assets (ROA) is defined as EBITDA/Assets (OIBDP/AT). Tangibility
is the ratio of fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment)to total assets (PPENT/AT). Firm size is the log of sales
(SALE). Industry is defined using SIC3. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. Models are
estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm.










































(1) (2) (3) (4)
dlSPREAD dlSPREAD dlSPREAD dlSPREAD
Industry downgrade (t-1) 0.0388∗∗ (2.32) 0.0433∗∗ (2.53) 0.0441∗∗ (2.24) 0.0387∗∗ (2.31)
Industry upgrade (t-1) 0.0139 (0.72) 0.0313 (1.46) 0.00789 (0.33) 0.0148 (0.76)
Firm downgrade (t-1) -0.0677∗∗∗ (-2.93) -0.0697∗∗∗ (-3.02) -0.0701∗∗∗ (-2.70) -0.0645∗∗∗ (-2.76)
Firm upgrade (t-1) 0.0337 (1.34) 0.0246 (0.97) 0.0378 (1.33) 0.0331 (1.30)
Industry downgrade (t) -0.0232 (-1.24) -0.0207 (-1.02) -0.0232 (-1.00) -0.0228 (-1.20)
Industry upgrade (t) 0.0155 (0.99) 0.0379∗∗ (2.26) 0.0357∗ (1.95) 0.0152 (0.97)
Firm upgrade (t) -0.132∗∗∗ (-6.43) -0.138∗∗∗ (-6.59) -0.129∗∗∗ (-5.18) -0.129∗∗∗ (-6.09)
Firm downgrade (t) 0.235∗∗∗ (10.45) 0.225∗∗∗ (9.93) 0.193∗∗∗ (7.77) 0.234∗∗∗ (10.30)
Leverage -0.0235 (-0.66) -0.0841∗ (-1.96) -0.447∗∗∗ (-3.43) -0.0190 (-0.47)
Market-to-book -0.0144 (-1.56) -0.00395 (-0.39) 0.0383∗ (1.93) -0.0121 (-1.15)
Tangibility -0.0364∗ (-1.80) -0.0392 (-1.26) -0.452∗∗∗ (-3.04) -0.0330 (-1.57)
Size -0.00163 (-0.28) -0.0102 (-1.47) -0.0541∗∗ (-2.20) 0.0000333 (0.01)
ROA 0.191∗∗ (2.11) 0.189∗ (1.91) 0.591∗∗∗ (3.85) 0.177∗ (1.85)
Log(amount outstading) -0.00433 (-0.66) 0.00191 (0.25) 0.0233 (1.15) -0.00474 (-0.69)
Log(maturity) -0.0289∗∗ (-2.23) -0.0325∗∗ (-2.34) -0.0608∗∗ (-2.12) -0.0314∗∗ (-2.34)
Coupon -0.0150∗∗∗ (-3.13) -0.0143∗∗∗ (-2.74) -0.0745∗∗∗ (-7.69) -0.0149∗∗ (-2.47)
D.Leverage -0.0458 (-0.38) -0.0210 (-0.17) 0.130 (0.93) -0.0388 (-0.32)
D.Market-to-book -0.00297 (-0.15) -0.00958 (-0.47) -0.0133 (-0.56) -0.00383 (-0.19)
D.Tangibility 0.207 (1.33) 0.203 (1.30) 0.243 (1.39) 0.203 (1.30)
D.Size 0.0444 (1.13) 0.0442 (1.12) -0.00984 (-0.18) 0.0455 (1.14)
D.ROA -0.0145 (-0.13) -0.0108 (-0.10) -0.0568 (-0.42) -0.00546 (-0.05)
D.Log(amount outstading) -0.0380∗ (-1.95) -0.0419∗∗ (-2.17) -0.0569∗∗∗ (-2.71) -0.0391∗∗ (-2.00)
D.Log(maturity) 0.0211 (0.75) 0.0253 (0.90) 0.0430 (1.35) 0.0222 (0.79)
D.Coupon 0.0208∗ (1.67) 0.0198 (1.57) 0.0433∗∗∗ (2.97) 0.0205 (1.64)
Constant 0.690∗∗∗ (5.63) 0.595∗∗∗ (4.56) 1.546∗∗∗ (3.81) 0.433 (0.85)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Rating FE No No No Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No
Observations 3520 3510 3520 3520
Adjusted R2 0.592 0.593 0.613 0.591
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Bond credit spread changes in investment grade vs. speculative rivals
Column 1 includes the sample of investment grade rival firms (rated BBB or above), whereas
column 2 includes rival firms with speculative grade rating (rated BBB- or below). Dummy
variable Firm downgrade is assigned a value one if a firm has been downgraded in the fiscal
year t. Dummy variable Firm upgrade is assigned a value one if a firm has been upgraded in
the fiscal year t Competitor i belongs to the same industry as downgraded/upgraded firm
j in the fiscal year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Down-
grade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in an
industry. Book leverage is the book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets
(AT). Market-to-book is calculated as [total assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQ) +
market value of equity (PRCCF × CSHO]/total assets (AT). Return on assets (ROA) is
defined as EBITDA/Assets (OIBDP/AT). Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets (property,
plant, and equipment)to total assets (PPENT/AT). Firm size is the log of sales (SALE). In-
dustry is defined using SIC3. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table
footer. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct
for correlation across observations of a given firm. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
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(1) (2)
Investment Grade Speculative Grade
Industry downgrade (t-1) 0.0358 (1.27) 0.0682∗∗∗ (3.21)
Industry upgrade (t-1) 0.0181 (0.46) 0.0454∗∗ (2.10)
Firm downgrade (t-1) 0.0442 (0.97) -0.127∗∗∗ (-4.67)
Firm upgrade (t-1) 0.0863∗ (1.94) -0.0252 (-0.93)
Industry downgrade (t) -0.0222 (-0.58) -0.0163 (-0.80)
Industry upgrade (t) 0.0511∗ (1.88) 0.0279 (1.46)
Firm upgrade (t) -0.115∗∗∗ (-2.60) -0.133∗∗∗ (-5.72)
Firm downgrade (t) 0.192∗∗∗ (5.37) 0.217∗∗∗ (7.19)
Leverage -0.0545 (-0.47) -0.146∗∗∗ (-2.99)
Market-to-book -0.00783 (-0.53) 0.00392 (0.18)
Tangibility -0.0489 (-0.72) -0.0402 (-1.01)
Size 0.0138 (0.93) -0.0237∗∗∗ (-2.86)
ROA 0.150 (0.75) 0.243∗∗ (2.19)
Log(amount outstading) -0.0182 (-1.22) 0.0119 (1.16)
Log(maturity) -0.0466∗ (-1.96) 0.0105 (0.59)
Coupon -0.0233 (-1.64) -0.00436 (-0.67)
D.Leverage -0.0547 (-0.22) -0.0501 (-0.37)
D.Market-to-book -0.00160 (-0.06) -0.0296 (-0.96)
D.Tangibility 0.306 (1.07) 0.0418 (0.25)
D.Size -0.0839 (-1.23) 0.0699 (1.64)
D.ROA 0.188 (0.72) -0.00337 (-0.03)
D.Log(amount outstading) -0.0518∗ (-1.81) -0.0225 (-1.04)
D.Log(maturity) 0.00422 (0.11) 0.0645∗ (1.72)
D.Coupon 0.00164 (0.06) 0.0189 (1.47)
Constant 0.878∗∗∗ (4.22) 0.135 (0.75)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 1609 1901
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.674
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Relative size of rivals. Small rival is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 the
the rival firm is smaller than the firm subject to credit rating adjustment and 0 otherwise.
Large rival is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 the the rival firm is larger than the firm
subject to credit rating adjustment and 0 otherwise. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered




Industry downgrade (t-1) x small rival 0.0410∗∗ (2.44)
Industry downgrade (t-1) x large rival 0.0386∗ (1.85)
Industry upgrade (t-1) x small rival 0.0370 (1.64)
Industry upgrade (t-1) x large rival 0.0264 (1.00)
Firm downgrade (t-1) -0.0699∗∗∗ (-3.13)
Firm upgrade (t-1) 0.0216 (0.84)
Firm upgrade (t) -0.116∗∗∗ (-5.92)






















t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Level of competitiveness in the industry. Firms are classified as competitive
if their HHI index is below the median and as concentrated if their HHI index is above
the median for a given year. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table
footer. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct
for correlation across observations of a given firm. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
(1) (2)
Competitive Concentrated
Industry downgrade (t-1) 0.0912∗∗∗ (3.47) -0.00286 (-0.13)
Industry upgrade (t-1) 0.0160 (0.43) 0.0371 (1.54)
Firm downgrade (t-1) -0.0834∗∗ (-2.43) -0.0509 (-1.60)
Firm upgrade (t-1) 0.0187 (0.50) 0.0279 (0.84)
Industry downgrade (t) -0.0676∗∗ (-2.09) 0.0210 (0.87)
Industry upgrade (t) 0.0257 (0.98) 0.0762∗∗∗ (3.51)
Firm upgrade (t) -0.132∗∗∗ (-4.34) -0.160∗∗∗ (-5.23)
Firm downgrade (t) 0.199∗∗∗ (5.73) 0.233∗∗∗ (7.56)
Leverage -0.0906 (-1.17) -0.0958∗ (-1.72)
Market-to-book 0.00292 (0.21) -0.0156 (-1.00)
Tangibility -0.0605 (-1.14) -0.00382 (-0.09)
Size -0.00907 (-0.61) -0.0114 (-1.29)
ROA 0.123 (0.98) 0.320∗ (1.86)
Log(amount outstading) -0.00593 (-0.43) 0.0110 (1.03)
Log(maturity) 0.00848 (0.39) -0.0755∗∗∗ (-4.18)
Coupon -0.00908 (-1.21) -0.0174∗∗ (-2.16)
D.Leverage -0.0605 (-0.33) 0.0619 (0.39)
D.Market-to-book -0.0358 (-1.37) 0.0436 (1.36)
D.Tangibility 0.202 (0.94) 0.145 (0.61)
D.Size 0.0674 (1.25) 0.0209 (0.36)
D.ROA -0.0247 (-0.16) -0.0604 (-0.35)
D.Log(amount outstading) -0.0220 (-0.84) -0.0583∗ (-1.88)
D.Log(maturity) 0.0239 (0.55) 0.0350 (0.97)
D.Coupon 0.0248 (1.27) 0.0138 (0.83)
Constant 0.339 (1.60) 0.861∗∗∗ (5.18)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 1693 1806
Adjusted R2 0.547 0.636
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Bond credit spread changes by analyst following. I classify peer firms
as transparent if they have at least one analyst following on I/B/E/S and opaque other-
wise. Column 1 presents the results for transparent firms and column 2 for opaque firms,
respectively. The industry is defined using SIC3 Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indi-
cated in the table footer. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by




Industry downgrade (t-1) 0.0424∗∗ (2.24) 0.0869∗ (1.95)
Industry upgrade (t-1) 0.0288 (1.20) 0.0518 (1.04)
Firm downgrade (t-1) -0.0558∗∗ (-2.22) -0.187∗∗∗ (-3.05)
Firm upgrade (t-1) 0.0356 (1.28) -0.0633 (-0.97)
Industry downgrade (t) -0.0249 (-1.10) 0.00950 (0.21)
Industry upgrade (t) 0.0312∗ (1.73) 0.0811∗ (1.70)
Firm upgrade (t) -0.148∗∗∗ (-6.41) -0.0779 (-1.55)
Firm downgrade (t) 0.214∗∗∗ (8.73) 0.271∗∗∗ (5.09)
Leverage -0.101∗∗ (-2.09) 0.0853 (0.66)
Market-to-book -0.00391 (-0.36) 0.0221 (0.56)
Tangibility -0.0492 (-1.28) -0.0335 (-0.40)
Size -0.0130 (-1.58) 0.000806 (0.06)
ROA 0.203∗ (1.95) 0.0954 (0.28)
Log(amount outstading) 0.00128 (0.15) 0.0156 (0.78)
Log(maturity) -0.0295∗∗ (-1.97) -0.0720 (-1.47)
Coupon -0.0159∗∗∗ (-2.81) -0.00810 (-0.38)
D.Leverage -0.00167 (-0.01) -0.0568 (-0.22)
D.Market-to-book -0.00714 (-0.32) -0.00301 (-0.06)
D.Tangibility 0.292 (1.64) -0.00235 (-0.01)
D.Size 0.0170 (0.44) 0.256∗∗∗ (2.68)
D.ROA 0.0491 (0.41) -0.353 (-1.08)
D.Log(amount outstading) -0.0299 (-1.41) -0.143∗∗∗ (-4.02)
D.Log(maturity) 0.00523 (0.17) 0.178∗∗∗ (2.73)
D.Coupon 0.0284∗∗ (2.06) -0.0289 (-1.26)
Constant 0.618∗∗∗ (4.28) 0.517 (1.13)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 3043 467
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.725
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Classification of S&P’s bond rating adjustments. Adjusted firms. Group
1 : changes within investment grade, Group 2 : changes from investment grade to speculative
grade, Group 3 : changes within speculative grade. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered




Group 1: Downgrade within investment grade 0.101∗∗∗ (3.03)
Group 2: Downgrade from investment to speculative grade 0.258∗∗∗ (5.72)
Group 3: Downgrade within speculative grade 0.169∗∗∗ (6.59)
Group 1: Upgrade within investment grade -0.0804∗ (-1.93)
Group 2: Upgrade from investment to speculative grade -0.0964∗∗ (-2.27)






















t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Classification of S&P’s bond rating changes. Rival firms. Group 1 :
changes within investment grade, Group 2 : changes from investment grade to speculative
grade, Group 3 : changes within speculative grade. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered




Group 1: Downgrade within investment grade 0.0666∗∗ (2.36)
Group 2: Downgrade from investment to speculative grade -0.0183 (-0.46)
Group 3: Downgrade within speculative grade -0.0293 (-1.14)
Group 1: Upgrade within investment grade 0.0868∗∗ (2.40)
Group 2: Upgrade from investment to speculative grade 0.0427 (1.06)






















t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Main Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Spread Bond yield based on the last price for a bond in the month minus the
relevant end-of-month Treasury yield for the bond.
Bond size Amount outstanding of a bond issue.
Bond maturity Bond maturity measured in days.
Total assets Total book assets in billions USD.
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
Profitability Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets.
Market-to-book (Debt in current liabilities + total long-term debt + preferred stock
carrying value deferred taxes and investment tax credit + stock price
at the end of quarter x common shares outstanding) divided by total
assets.
Leverage (Debt in current liabilities + total long term debt) divided by total
assets.
S&P Rating S&P rating at the bond level. Ratings are converted to an ordinal scale
of 1-22, with 22 being the highest rated bond and 1 being the lowest
rated bond.
Analyst 1 id the firm is followed by at least one analyst in I/B/E/S in the fiscal
year prior to the event year, 0 otherwise.
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index computed using Compustat firms. It is
defined as the sum of squared market shares. Market shares are com-
puted using firms’ sales.
Chapter 3
Information Transfer Effects and
Leverage
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and the credit rating
changes of its industry rivals. A survey of CFOs confirms that some firms are not only
concerned about their own debt levels but also concerned about the debt levels of their
competitors (Graham and Harvey, 2001). If this is true, we would expect to find that credit
rating changes have an intra-industry effect. The objective of this paper therefore is to
analyze empirically whether managers factor in credit rating changes of rival firms when
making leverage decisions. The main finding of this paper is that a credit rating downgrade
of one firm is associated with subsequent leverage reductions of other firms in the industry.
A credit rating is an evaluation of the long-term creditworthiness of a firm, which can
be characterized as a subjective probability of default. Bond rating agencies claim their
ratings incorporate private information on the rated companies that is unavailable to other
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market participants (Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts, 1987). In addition to incorporating
various quantitative credit factors, rating agencies include qualitative measures such as the
competitiveness of the company within the industry or the quality of the firm’s management
(Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman, 2012). Ratings appear to provide valuable assessment
of firm’s ability to manage debt because the rating agencies specialize in collecting and
evaluating information about corporate creditworthiness (Kisgen, 2007).
Indeed, empirical findings confirm that bond ratings are have an information effect such
that changes in the bond rating of a company has observable effects. Both stock and bond
markets react to credit rating adjustments of firms (Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992;
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts, 1987; Ederington and Goh, 1998). Moreover, a firm’s
credit rating adjustments were also found to directly affect capital structure decisions of
its managers. Firms expecting a ratings downgrade were found to issue approximately 1.0%
less net debt relative to net equity annually as a percentage of total assets than firms not
expecting a downgrade (Kisgen, 2006).In addition, after firms experienced downgrades they
have been shown to respond by actually reducing their leverage (Kisgen, 2009).
The literature also confirms the existence of an intra-industry effect with respect to bond
ratings adjustments. When the bond rating of one firm changes, other companies in the same
industry are affected. Thus, the information of a firm’s bond rating change will not only
be company specific, but also industry-specific, as unexpected news about a given firm may
reveal relevant information about its competitors’ prospects. Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte
(1997) explore the potential secondary impact of bond rating changes on stock returns.
They find that downgrades, in addition to being bad news for the downgraded company, are
also bad news on average for the industry. Specifically, the stock market responds to the
downgrade of one company in an industry by demanding lower prices on stocks from other
firms in that industry.
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To date, there has been a considerable amount of research produced that investigates
similar intra-industry information transfer effects across firms for other corporate events
such as bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, initial and seasoned equity issues, earnings
announcements and stock repurchases. Most of the literature explores the intra-industry
effect as a market response. Lang and Stulz (1992), Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997),
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) and Jorion and Zhang (2007a, 2009) examine the
spillover effects of distress. They document that a bankruptcy of a given firm is associ-
ated with negative equity returns for industry rivals(as well as suppliers and creditors).
Schweitzer, Szewczyk, and Varma (2001) show that announcements of bank debt downgrades
are associated with statistically significant negative stock price responses for non-downgraded
banks.
This paper is similar to Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (1997) in that both examine the
intra-industry impact of bond rating changes. However, whereas their paper employs an
event study methodology to study the stock market reaction to rivals’ rating downgrades,
I examine leverage changes to test whether the firms themselves react to the credit rating
changes by adjusting their capital structure. This paper is also similar to Kisgen (2009)
in that it examines leverage changes in relation to bond rating announcements. However,
Kisgen’s paper examines the leverage changes of the firms whose rating was adjusted, I
investigate whether the adjustment has a spillover effect on industry rivals.
In summary, my paper is the first to provide evidence on how credit rating adjustments
by an industry rival affect leverage. I provide evidence that firms reduce their leverage
after a rival (or multiple rivals) experiences a credit rating downgrade. My findings also
contribute and extend the research on industry contagion. Whereas most studies focus on
short run stock market effects of industry contagion, this paper provides a different approach
by looking at the leverage adjustments and debt/equity issuance decisions.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops the hypotheses.
Section 3.3 introduces the data, presents the summary statistics, and describes the empirical
strategy. Section 3.4 presents the main results and sensitivity tests. Section 3.5 presents the
paper’s conclusions.
3.2 Hypothesis Development
The major concern of this study is whether the change in credit rating agency’s assessment
of an issuer’s creditworthiness will affect the leverage of its industry peers. This effect will
depend on the direction of the assessment change, the company and the industry.
Kisgen (2009) find that firms reduce their leverage after their credit rating has been down-
graded. This is because managers, who have been shown to care about maintaining better
ratings (Kisgen, 2006), will alter capital structure and reduce leverage after downgrades in
an attempt to restore their target rating. This may be achieved by issuing equity rather
than debt or reducing debt rather than equity. These actions appear to be designed to avoid
downgrades and to achieve upgrades. The rivals of the downgraded firm, if they are also
rated, may become worried of sharing the fate of the affected firm and alter their capital
structure to prevent such downgrade from happening.
However, not all firms are rated. In fact, only about a quarter of my sample of firms
has a credit rating. Nonetheless, this does not mean that these unrated companies should
not be affected by a rival credit rating adjustment. Credit rating changes may release in-
formation about the state of that firm’s industry, as well as the industries of its suppliers
or its customers (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Jorion and Zhang, 2007a). These spillover effects
arise through an information channel, where the credit rating change of a given firm re-
veals positive or negative information about pre-existing issues at other firms. Moreover,
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the credit rating change may directly transmit costs (or benefits) along the supply chain in
the form of increased or decreased credit risk. Such risk contagion can arise from counter-
party risk when the poor financial standing of one firm causes financial distress on entities
with which it has close business ties or which have financial claims (Jorion and Zhang, 2009;
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008). Thus, to examine whether credit rating adjust-
ments have a spillover effect on industry rivals, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The credit rating downgrade/upgrade of a firm is likely to induce industry
rivals to decrease/increase their leverage.
Most research on response to credit rating adjustments finds dominant contagion effect.
Contagion implies that a negative credit event will impact industry rivals negatively. The
opposite of the contagion effect is competition effect, which implies that a negative credit
event for one firm will positively impact this firm’s industry rivals. This is because these
rivals may benefit from any resulting reduction in the number of competitors and increase
in their market power (Platt, 2015). These effects are not mutually exclusive. A bond
rating change announcement may be good news to some industry competitors and bad news
for others. Lang and Stulz (1992) explore bankruptcy filings and find that in concentrated
industries such extreme credit events can have positive consequences for the rivals resulting
from increased market power and/or market share. Hertzel and Officer (2012) also finds
that contagion in loan spreads is mitigated in concentrated industries. Therefore, my second
hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Firms operating in more competitive industries will be more likely to adjust
their leverage downward as a response to a credit rating downgrade of a rival firm.
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3.3 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
I test the impact of credit rating changes on capital structure decisions using the following
models: First, I use the partial adjustment model of capital structure as defined in Kisgen
(2009) and Flannery and Rangan (2006). Second, I use the debt-equity choice framework
as conducted in Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001). Additionally, I use the regressions
of net capital issuance as employed by Graham (1996) and Kisgen (2009). Using alternate
frameworks allows me to verify the robustness of the rating effects.
3.3.1 Sample
The sample is constructed from all firms available in Compustat and the stock return data
is from CRSP. Firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999) are not included in the sample because their capital structures are likely to be
very different from other firms in my sample. In addition, I restrict the sample to include
only firms with book value of assets above $1 million. To limit the influence of outliers, all
ratio variables are trimmed at the top 1% and, for variables that take on negative values, the
bottom 1% of their values, with exception of book debt ratio, which is trimmed to exclude
observations with book debt ratios of one and higher. Observations with missing values of
the relevant variables are also excluded. The resulting sample consists of 72,503 observations.
Equity issues and repurchases are defined using the methodology in Hovakimian et al.
(2001). A firm is defined as issuing (repurchasing)equity when net equity issued (repur-
chased) for cash divided by the book value of assets exceeded 5%.
My measure of credit rating is the S&P long term issuer rating, which was extracted from
Compustat. For letter credit ratings I apply a scale from 1 to 22, with AAA rating assigned
a 22 and Selected Default (SD) a 1.
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Table 1 Panel A presents the time series of credit rating adjustments in my final sample.
As my study covers a period from 1987 to 2012, it includes periods dominated by both
downgrades and upgrades. Therefore, the sample is not biased towards a particular direction
of the market. Panel B shows the distribution of credit rating adjustments by industry of the
downgraded or upgraded firm. The industries are defined using Fama and French’s 12 broad
categories.1 The credit rating adjustments are distributed across a variety of industries, with
slight concentrations in manufacturing and wholesale and retail.
Table 2 presents the percentage of firm years that have debt and equity issuance and
repurchase activity, with firm-years separated by the previous year’s change in rating. Is-
suance and repurchase is defined as a net amount greater than 5% of the beginning of period
assets, as in Hovakimian et al. (2001). The table indicates that rivals of downgraded firms
are less likely to issue debt and more likely to issue equity. The rivals of upgraded firms are
more likely to issue debt and equity and less likely to repurchase debt.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Book
leverage is the book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets (AT). Market
leverage is the market value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets (total assets (AT)
- book value of equity (CEQ) + market value of equity (PRCCF × CSHO). Market-to-book
is calculated as [total assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQ) + market value of equity
(PRCCF × CSHO]/total assets (AT). Return on assets (ROA) is defined as EBITDA/Assets
(OIBDP/AT). Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment)to total
assets (PPENT/AT). Firm size is the log of sales (SALE). The stock return is measured
as the percentage return over the last year. R&D expenses is the ratio of research and
development expenses to sales (XRD/SALE). R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to
one if the R&D expense is larger than zero.
1For details, see Ken French’s data library website: {http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/
ken.french/Data.library.html
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3.3.2 Specifications
I test for the impact of rating changes on capital structure decisions within two different
capital structure empirical frameworks. The first framework is the partial adjustment model
of capital structure as formulated in Flannery and Rangan (2006) and adopted by Kisgen
(2009) in his credit rating impact on downgraded/upgraded firm’s leverage regressions. The
second framework is regressions of net capital issuance and debt-equity choice.
The model from Flannery and Rangan (2006) is modified to examine the incremental
effects of rating changes of rivals by directly including rating changes of rivals’ dummies in
this equation:
DRi,t+1 −DRi,t = λβXi,t − λDRi,t + φ1DOWNINDi,t + φ2UPINDi,t + ǫi,t (3.1)
DOWNIND and UPIND are dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm in an industry was
downgraded or upgraded the previous year, respectively. Industry is defined using SIC4
codes. Lagged changes in ratings are used to reduce potential endogeneity issues. The set of
independent variables X includes firm size, market-to-book, asset tangibility, profitability,
research and development expenses (R&D), R&D indicator, industry median leverage ratio
and stock return.
The second set of tests implements the following regressions:
NetDIi,t = α+ φ1DOWNINDi,t−1 + φ2UPINDi,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + ǫi,t (3.2)
Net debt issuance (NetDI) is a measure that identifies direct capital market activity decisions
of managers. It is defined as the firm’s leverage-changing capital market decision at time t,
equal to a firm’s net debt issuance minus net equity issuance divided by assets. Specifically,
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net debt issuance is long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in
current debt, and net equity issuance is the sale of common and preferred stock minus the
purchase of common and preferred stock (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Kisgen, 2006, 2009).
Next, following Hovakimian (2004) I estimate binomial logistic regressions to model the
choice between debt and equity, given the firm’s decision to issue (repurchase) securities.
3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.4 presents the results of tests using the model of Flannery and Rangan (2006) and
replicates the analysis in Table 3 of Kisgen (2009). The control variables include profitability,
M/B ratio, depreciation, size of the firm, stock return, fixed assets, R&D expense and R&D
indicator dummy. The book debt ratio is defined as the book value of debt divided by the
book value of debt plus book value of equity. The market debt ratio is defined as the book
value of debt divided by the book value of debt plus the market capitalization of equity. The
sample includes all available firms from Compustat for which the SIC code is available.
Column 1 of Table 3.4 includes dummy variables indicating whether the credit rating
of industry rival was upgraded or downgraded in the previous year. The downgraded or
upgraded firm is not included. The coefficient on the downgrade in the industry variable is
negative and statistically significant. The coefficient suggests that the firms whose indus-
try rival got downgraded reduce their leverage by 0.4% compared to other firms. To put
this number in perspective, Kisgen (2009) finds that downgraded firms reduce their market
leverage by 1.4% compared to other firms. Column 2 includes firm fixed effects into the
regression, and confirm the results from Column 1. Columns 3-4 repeat the analysis from
columns 1-2 using market leverage instead of book leverage and report similar results. These
results indicated that the downgrades of industry rivals affect subsequent leverage behavior.
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The upgrade of a rival firm does not seem to have a significant impact on the leverage
of the firms in the industry in book leverage regressions. In market leverage regressions
in Columns 3 coefficient is positive and significant, however, after adding firm fixed effect
the coefficient becomes insignificant. This is consistent with the literature on the effects of
credit rating adjustments that consistently finds much weaker or insignificant responses of
rival firms to credit rating upgrades (Akhigbe et al., 1997).
Results of the regression of Equation (3.2) are given in Table 3.5. Two separate tests are
conducted, one is using the changes in book and market leverage with assets in NetDI variable
calculated according to the measure used in the corresponding regression. The explanatory
variables have been chosen have been shown to predict capital structure behavior and are
consistent with literature. The results indicate that firms in the industries that experienced
credit rating downgrade in a given year issue nearly 0.5% less net debt minus net equity as
a percentage of total assets the following year. Again, as a matter of comparison, Kisgen
(2009) shows that a downgraded firm issues 4% less debt relative to net equity then other
firms.
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results of the logit regressions of the choice between
issuing equity versus debt and the choice between repurchasing equity versus retiring debt.
The dependent variable is equal to one for equity issues (repurchases) and zero for debt issues
(reductions). The results for credit rating downgrades are consistent with the hypothesis that
rivals of firms which experience a credit rating downgrade are reducing their leverage. The
coefficient estimate for Downgrade(ind) dummy is positive in Column 1, which indicates that
firms which rivals were downgraded are less likely to issue debt vs.equity. The coefficient
is statistically significant at the 1% level. In Column 2, the coefficient for Downgrade(ind)
dummy is negative, implying that the rival firms are more likely to retire debt than repurchase
equity. However, this coefficient estimate is insignificant.
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Taken together, the results strongly suggest that industry rivals of downgraded firms
decrease their leverage in the subsequent period. The result is robust to alternative specifi-
cations and statistically significant in all estimations. The upgrade variable is not significant
across specifications which implies that there is no measurable response of industry rivals’
leverage decisions to another firm’s credit rating upgrade.
3.4.1 Industry Concentration
Having established that credit rating downgrades illicit subsequent leverage reductions of
industry rivals, I conduct additional tests aimed at understanding more about which firms
respond to industry rivals credit rating adjustments, as well as the reasons for this finding.
First, I examine the effect of industry concentration on the leverage response to credit
rating change. Lang and Stulz (1992) find that bankruptcy filings in concentrated industries
can have positive consequences for rivals because of increased market share or power.2 Con-
sistent with Lang and Stulz (1992) and Hertzel and Officer (2012), I find that the contagion
of increased bankruptcy risk is mitigated in concentrated industries. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that negative credit events in concentrated industries can have positive con-
sequences for rivals as they potentially increase their market share and/or market power.
Brander and Lewis (1988) also predict that industries with less competition should benefit
more from the collapse of one of the firms because the remaining firms will have more market
power. Therefore, negative effects of credit rating downgrades should be stronger when the
industry is less concentrated.
To measure industry concentration, I use the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index (HHI) of the
2Lang and Stulz (1992) look at the effects of a firm’s bankruptcy announcement on its industry rivals and
find two distinct types of effects, contagion and competition. Contagion implies that a negative credit event
will impact industry rivals negatively, since the event will reveal new information about negative shocks to
cash flows that are common across the industry.
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where sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are computed
from Compustat using firms’ sales (Giroud and Mueller, 2011). When computing the HHI,
I use all available Compustat firms that have available SIC codes. I exclude firms for which
sales are missing or negative. HHI a is widely used measure in the empirical industrial
organization literature as a proxy for the intensity of product market competition. It is also
routinely used by government agencies. A higher HHI implies weaker competition. I classify
industries using four-digit SIC industries (Kahle and Walkling, 1996).
Table 3.7 presents the model from Equation (3.2) on a split sample by concentration. Low
concentration is the lowest quartile of firms ranked by HHI. High concentration is the highest
HHI quartile (Valta, 2012). The main variable of interest, Downgrade(ind) is negative and
significant at the 1% level for the Low concentration sample and insignificant, and also
smaller in magnitude, for the High concentration sample. This confirms the hypothesis that
firms operating in more competitive industries will be more likely to adjust their leverage
downwards as a response to a credit rating downgrade of a rival firm.
3.4.2 Bond Market Access and Size
The tradeoff theory of capital structure states that each firm chooses its optimal capital
structure by comparing the costs and benefits of issuing new debt versus issuing new stock.
The theory is based on the assumption that there is an infinite supply of capital. However,
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that, in practice, firms that lack access to the public
debt markets are more restricted in their ability to borrow and therefore have lower leverage
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ratios than firms with such access. Specifically, they show that U.S. firms with public bond
market access have about six to eight percentage points higher leverage ratios than firms
without such access. This result reflects the reasoned assumption that firms with bond
market access will have higher leverage compared to firms without access because lenders
are more willing to provide more funds and/or these firms can access a cheaper source of
capital. For these firms a downgrade of their own credit rating will not only increase their
borrowing costs but potentially signal weakness to the market and, as a consequence, affect
their stock price. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that rated firms’ leverage will be
affected by credit rating downgrades of industry rivals.
However, the results are perplexing. I find that rivals of downgraded companies that do
not have access to the public bond markets as proxied by the existence of a bond credit
rating for that company, experience a significant negative leverage response to credit rat-
ing downgrades, while rivals of downgraded companies that do have access to public bond
markets, do not exhibit a strong response to the credit ratings’ adjustments of rivals.
The explanation for this phenomenon can be two-fold. For example, rated firms may wish
to maintain sub-optimal leverage to begin with, due to their greater concern of rating down-
grades. Therefore, there is less need to worry about the downgrades of rival firms. The second
reason could be the size of the company in question. Platt (2015) and Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl
(2010) find that the intra-industry effect of credit rating downgrades on the cost of corporate
debt varies across the relative size of the rival and downgraded firms. It appears that smaller
rivals are more vulnerable than their larger counterparts to credit events in the industry.
3.4.3 Adjustment Speed
Lastly, a number of recent studies, such as Warr et al. (2012), Leary and Roberts (2005),
Byoun (2008) and Faulkender et al. (2012) show that there is an asymmetry is the speed
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of adjustment such that overlevered firms (with actual leverage ratio above the optimal
leverage ratio) adjust more rapidly than underlevered firms (with actual leverage ratio below
the optimal leverage ratio). I tested if overlevered firms decrease their leverage more as a
response to a credit rating downgrade of an industry rival than underlevered firms. Table
3.11 shows that overlevered firms adjust their leverage more and that the coefficient on the
variable of interest Downgrade(ind) is more significant.
3.5 Conclusion
Prior research into intra-industry information transfer focuses mostly on stock price reactions
and changes of the CDS spreads of industry rivals. In this paper I expand the literature
by considering how leverage ratios are affected by the credit rating changes of industry
rivals. I specifically explore whether the changes in credit ratings of industry rivals affect
firm’s capital structure decisions. I find that a credit rating downgrade is associated with
subsequent leverage reductions by rival firms in the industry. This result is robust to several
different specifications. I also find that firms operating in more competitive environments
are more likely to decrease their leverage as a response to the downgrade of an industry
rival. Also unrated, smaller companies are more likely to be subject to such adjustment as
opposed to larger, rated firms.
A question that is left for future research to explore is whether credit rating downgrades
affect competitors in a causal manner, or whether the effect I observe is purely a reflection
of new information available about an industry, or both. A study which disentangles these
two effects could be a potential follow up to this study.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Credit Rating Upgrades and Downgrades by Year and
Industry. This table shows the distribution of the sample of credit rating adjustments for
the sample from 1988 to 2012. The sample includes all firms from Compustat excluding
financials and utilities. The credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s Long-Term Domestic
Issuer Credit Rating as reported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Year is the year when the
credit rating adjustment occured. Industry is defined using the Fama and French 12-industry
categorization.
Panel A: Credit rating adjustments - time series
Year Downgraded Upgraded
Downgrade in Upgrade in Number of
industry industry observations
1988 79 62 776 397 3,409
1989 55 69 643 394 3,363
1990 85 41 1,065 383 3,369
1991 82 55 848 560 3,453
1992 56 71 545 749 3,656
1993 57 79 617 958 3,853
1994 50 51 754 487 4,013
1995 67 95 944 1,151 4,340
1996 63 75 924 797 4,598
1997 59 91 721 920 4,521
1998 81 92 1,048 1,039 4,273
1999 111 48 1,244 326 3,936
2000 134 59 1,604 518 3,842
2001 185 54 1,894 409 3,838
2002 176 52 1,845 358 3,677
2003 141 83 1,197 626 3,483
2004 94 78 958 816 3,335
2005 114 91 839 728 3,232
2006 108 88 742 661 3,096
2007 109 94 632 972 3,007
2008 144 92 875 824 2,956
2009 149 60 929 648 2,865
2010 55 157 255 1,251 2,713
2011 50 126 357 810 2,333
Total 2,304 1,863 22,256 16,782 88,680
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Panel B: Credit rating adjustments - industry
Industry Number of downgrades Number of upgrades
1 Consumer nondurables 214 118
2 Consumer durables 144 83
3 Manufacturing 458 329
4 Energy 118 149
5 Consumer nondurables 130 94
6 Business equipment 209 212
7 Telecom 162 129
9 Wholesale, retail 354 306
10 Healthcare 96 133
12 Other 419 310
Total 2304 1863
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics. This table presents the summary statistics of the sam-
ple. Competitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as downgraded/upgraded firm
j in the fiscal year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Down-
grade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in
an industry. The downgraded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the sample of com-
petitors. Book leverage is the book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets
(AT). Market leverage is the market value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total as-
sets (total assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQ) + market value of equity (PRCCF ×
CSHO). Market-to-book is calculated as [total assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQ)
+ market value of equity (PRCCF × CSHO]/total assets (AT). Return on assets (ROA) is
defined as EBITDA/Assets (OIBDP/AT). Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets (property,
plant, and equipment)to total assets (PPENT/AT). Firm size is the log of sales (SALE). The
stock return is measured as the percentage return over the last year. R&D expenses is the
ratio of research and development expenses to sales (XRD/SALE). A dummy variable equal
to one if the R&D expense is larger than zero.
count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
Downgrade(ind) 72,503 .261 .439 0 0 0 1 1
Upgrade(ind) 72,503 .195 .397 0 0 0 0 1
Book Leverage 72,503 .216 .198 0 .0306 .184 .341 1
Market Leverage 72,503 .171 .176 0 .0159 .119 .27 .992
Market-to-Book 72,503 1.79 1.22 .166 1.05 1.39 2.06 9.85
ROA 72,503 .115 .158 -.701 .0524 .128 .2 .641
Tangibility 72,503 .275 .22 0 .103 .214 .389 .991
Sales 72,503 1,655 9,113 1.02 41.6 164 681 444,948
Assets - Total 72,503 1,695 9,142 1 39.3 150 643 448,507
Return 72,503 .16 .861 -.996 -.263 .0279 .36 48.3
RD 72,503 .0539 .128 0 0 0 .0534 1.36
RD Dummy 72,503 .647 .478 0 0 1 1 1
Observations 72503
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Table 3.3: Debt and Equity Decisions of Rivals Following Rating Changes. Per-
centage of firm-years in which the firm undertakes the indicated market activity given the
change in rating of industry rival(s) in the previous year. The firms directly subject to
upgrade/downgrade are excluded. Issuance and reduction are defined as a net issuance or
reduction greater than 5% of beginning of period assets as in Hovakimian et al. (2001)). The
indicated change in rating is as of the year prior to the capital structure decision. The
sample includes all firms from Compustat excluding financials and utilities.
Downgrades d dr e er
No downgrade .2547099 .1783161 .1552145 .0516555
Downgrade .2399985 .1791999 .1409522 .0449955
Upgrades d dr e er
No upgrade .2436315 .1855244 .1468596 .0463932
Upgrade .2634945 .1641292 .1668305 .0563861
Table 3.4: Leverage Changes Following Credit Rating Change in an Industry. The
sample includes all firms from Compustat excluding financials and utilities. The credit
rating used is Standard and Poor’s Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as reported
in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Competitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as down-
graded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement.
Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value one if there was a rating
downgrade/upgrade in an industry. The downgraded/upgraded firm has been excluded from
the sample of competitors. Book leverage is the book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided
by total assets (AT). Market leverage is the market value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided
by total assets (total assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQ) + market value of equity
(PRCCF × CSHO). Market-to-book is calculated as [total assets (AT) - book value of equity
(CEQ) + market value of equity (PRCCF × CSHO]/total assets (AT). Return on assets
(ROA) is defined as EBITDA/Assets (OIBDP/AT). Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets
(property, plant, and equipment)to total assets (PPENT/AT). Firm size is the log of sales
(SALE). The stock return is measured as the percentage return over the last year. R&D
expenses is the ratio of research and development expenses to sales (XRD/SALE). A dummy
variable equal to one if the R&D expense is larger than zero. Models include fixed effects
(FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one pe-
riod. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct for
correlation across observations of a given firm. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION TRANSFER EFFECTS AND LEVERAGE 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dLEVB dLEVB dLEVM dLEVM
Downgrade(ind) -0.00420∗∗ -0.00243∗ -0.00464∗∗ -0.00363∗∗
(-4.42) (-2.34) (-5.31) (-3.85)
Upgrade(ind) 0.00185 0.00105 0.00319∗∗ 0.0000623
(1.81) (0.93) (3.40) (0.06)
Book Leverage -0.133∗∗ -0.379∗∗
(-42.68) (-63.44)
Market Leverage -0.142∗∗ -0.407∗∗
(-43.93) (-65.76)
Market-to-Book 0.0000966 -0.000569 -0.000406 0.000679
(0.23) (-0.89) (-1.42) (1.58)
ROA -0.0276∗∗ -0.0142∗∗ -0.00137 0.00135
(-7.63) (-2.79) (-0.51) (0.34)
Tangibility 0.0257∗∗ 0.0563∗∗ 0.0211∗∗ 0.0630∗∗
(9.22) (7.80) (8.03) (9.52)
Size 0.000949∗∗ 0.00559∗∗ 0.000510∗∗ 0.0129∗∗
(4.60) (7.43) (2.74) (18.68)
Return -0.00303∗∗ -0.00316∗∗ 0.00274∗∗ -0.00123∗∗
(-5.68) (-5.82) (6.16) (-3.02)
RD -0.0109∗ 0.00263 -0.0131∗∗ -0.00538
(-2.44) (0.31) (-4.45) (-1.05)
RD Dummy -0.00661∗∗ -0.00411 -0.00789∗∗ -0.00153
(-6.23) (-1.52) (-7.80) (-0.60)
Constant 0.0373∗∗ 0.0487∗∗ 0.0310∗∗ -0.00768
(6.22) (9.40) (5.59) (-1.62)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 71572 71871 71688 71988
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.174 0.060 0.192
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Net Debt Changes. Net debt raised for the year minus net equity raised for
the year divided by beginning of year total book (column 1) or market (column 2) assets
on credit rating change in the industry dummy variables and on various explanatory vari-
ables. The sample includes all firms from Compustat excluding financials and utilities. The
credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as re-
ported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Competitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as
downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement.
Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value one if there was a rating down-
grade/upgrade in an industry. The downgraded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the
sample of competitors. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All
the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Models are estimated with robust stan-
dard errors and clustered by firm to correct for correlation across observations of a given
firm. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
NetDIb NetDIb NetDIm NetDIm
Downgrade(ind) -0.00530∗∗ -0.00548∗∗ -0.00446∗∗ -0.00331∗
(-2.80) (-2.59) (-3.78) (-2.52)
Upgrade(ind) 0.00279 0.00158 0.000895 -0.0000534
(1.33) (0.69) (0.69) (-0.04)
Book Leverage -0.102∗∗ -0.353∗∗
(-17.87) (-27.79)
Market Leverage -0.102∗∗ -0.301∗∗
(-22.65) (-32.43)
Market-to-Book -0.00714∗∗ -0.00361∗ -0.00651∗∗ -0.00755∗∗
(-6.25) (-2.43) (-15.66) (-11.65)
ROA 0.130∗∗ 0.0833∗∗ 0.0586∗∗ 0.0453∗∗
(14.33) (7.40) (13.83) (7.63)
Tangibility 0.00536 0.0801∗∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0585∗∗
(0.93) (5.72) (3.58) (6.38)
Size 0.00785∗∗ 0.0187∗∗ 0.00366∗∗ 0.00814∗∗
(17.91) (9.34) (14.23) (7.29)
Return -0.00446∗∗ -0.00271 -0.00106 -0.00247∗∗
(-3.23) (-1.80) (-1.48) (-3.25)
RD -0.0237∗ -0.0301 -0.0109 -0.0219
(-2.03) (-1.22) (-1.76) (-1.93)
RD Dummy -0.00596∗∗ -0.00542 -0.00477∗∗ -0.00348
(-2.68) (-0.96) (-3.39) (-0.93)
Constant -0.00692 -0.0439∗∗ 0.00989 0.00182
(-0.51) (-3.60) (1.14) (0.25)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 27571 27684 27577 27689
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.090 0.065 0.112
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Equity vs. Debt Choice. Logit regressions. The sample includes all firms from
Compustat excluding financials and utilities. The credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s
Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as reported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Com-
petitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal
year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind)
is assigned a value one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in an industry. The down-
graded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the sample of competitors. All the explanatory
variables are lagged by one period. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and
clustered by firm to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. Values in
parenthesis are t-statistics.
(1) (2)

























Pseudo R2 0.107 0.397
t statistics in parentheses
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Sample Split By Concentration. To measure industry concentration I use
the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index (HHI) of the industry. Industry is defined by SIC4. The
sample includes all firms from Compustat excluding financials and utilities. The credit rat-
ing used is Standard and Poor’s Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as reported in
Compustat (SPLTICRM). Competitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as down-
graded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement.
Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value one if there was a rating down-
grade/upgrade in an industry. The downgraded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the
sample of competitors. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All
the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Models are estimated with robust stan-
dard errors and clustered by firm to correct for correlation across observations of a given

























Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 18455 17549
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.050
t statistics in parentheses
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Sample Split By Bond Market Access. The sample includes all firms from
Compustat excluding financials and utilities. The credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s
Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as reported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Com-
petitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal
year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind)
is assigned a value one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in an industry. The down-
graded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the sample of competitors. Models include
fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged by
one period. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct

























Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 13691 57881
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.055
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Sample Split By Size. The sample includes all firms from Compustat excluding
financials and utilities. The credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s Long-Term Domestic
Issuer Credit Rating as reported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Competitor i belongs to the
same four-digit industry as downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal year t of the down-
grade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variableDowngrade/Upgrade(ind) is assigned a value
one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in an industry. The downgraded/upgraded firm
has been excluded from the sample of competitors. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as in-
dicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Models
are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct for correlation

























Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 34778 36794
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.050
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Sample Split By Rating and Size. The sample includes all firms from Com-
pustat excluding financials and utilities. The credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s
Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as reported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Com-
petitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal
year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind)
is assigned a value one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in an industry. The down-
graded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the sample of competitors. Models include
fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged by
one period. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct
for correlation across observations of a given firm. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Rated Not Rated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small Large Small Large
Downgrade(ind) 0.00871 -0.00167 -0.00496∗∗ -0.00442∗∗
(0.57) (-0.95) (-3.18) (-2.93)
Upgrade(ind) 0.0194 0.00224 0.0000229 0.00434∗∗
(1.15) (1.17) (0.01) (2.63)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 568 13123 34210 23671
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.052 0.059 0.051
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Sample Split By Deviation from Target. The sample includes all firms from
Compustat excluding financials and utilities. The credit rating used is Standard and Poor’s
Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating as reported in Compustat (SPLTICRM). Com-
petitor i belongs to the same four-digit industry as downgraded/upgraded firm j in the fiscal
year t of the downgrade/upgrade announcement. Dummy variable Downgrade/Upgrade(ind)
is assigned a value one if there was a rating downgrade/upgrade in an industry. The down-
graded/upgraded firm has been excluded from the sample of competitors. Models include
fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. All the explanatory variables are lagged by
one period. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and clustered by firm to correct

























Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 40005 31567
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.058
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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